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Abstract 
This treatise addresses the possible creation of an African criminal court for individual 
criminal responsibility for crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It 
does so by critically analysing the Statutes of Special Court of Sierra Leone, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 
relation to the provisions addressing the principle of individual criminal responsibility, 
jurisdiction, amnesty and immunity. Another aim is to indicate the strength and weaknesses 
of the cited statutes in relation to the above provisions. Finally a further aim is to provide an 
analysis of the statutes, and any other international law applicable and determine whether 
Africa needs a separate criminal court. 
The principle conclusion is that statutes are facing challenges in relations to the provisions 
above. It is established that Africa does not have a regional criminal court and the African 
Union has attempted to extend jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
to criminal jurisdiction but the process has amounted to heavy criticism and unforeseen legal 
implications. It is eventually concluded that Africa may consider the creation of a separate 
criminal court for the future and such a court is currently not needed. Support should be 
given to the ICC.    
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Chapter One 
Introduction   
1 1 Background 
Today, one of Africa‟s biggest threats is modern-day armed conflicts which consequently 
amount to violations of international humanitarian law.1 In addition, international crimes such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, are committed by those involved. In 
1986, president Museveni of Uganda, emphasised on pursuit of justice and protection of 
human rights and the two principles should be valued over political interests.2 This has 
remained unrealistic as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes continue to play 
a major role in Africa.3 
Africa has witnessed and continues to experience series of activities arising from brutal 
armed conflicts in countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Chad, Uganda, 
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and 
Libya.4 In the United Nations5 Mapping Report on the Democratic Republic of Congo,6 617 
most serious incidents alone constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity or often 
both.7 Authors like Tom Lodge have argued that the root causes of armed conflict in Africa 
are:  
i. “Ethnic competition for control of the state;  
ii. Regional or secessionist rebellions;  
iii. Continuation of liberation conflicts;  
iv. Fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority; 
v. Warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse; and   
vi. Border disputes and protracted conflict within politicised militaries”.
8
  
An example of ethnic groups competing to gain control the country was in the armed conflict 
in Rwanda and Burundi between the Hutus and Tutsis.9 The armed conflict in Sudan is an 
example of a regional rebellion which began in 1957.10 Furthermore, Angola suffered a 
                                                             
1
Williamson, J “Overview of the International Criminal Jurisdiction Operating in Africa” March 2006 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_861_williamson.pdf (accessed 2012- 10-25) [111]. 
2
Kahn, N “Fighting Impunity: the International Criminal Court and the African Union” September 2009 
http://www.cps.org.za/cps%20pdf/polbrief62.pdf (accessed 2012-10-25) [2]. 
3
Ibid. 
4
University of Witswatersrand School of Law “Africa and the Future of the International Criminal Justice” July 
2010 http://www.asil.org/files/africaigcallforpapers.pdf (accessed 2012-9-21) [2]. 
5
Hereafter referred to as UN. 
6
Hereafter referred to as DRC or Congo. 
7
UN “DR Congo: UN Releases Most Extensive Report on War Massacres, Rapes” no date  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr1=congo&NewsID=36306&Cr=democratic  (accessed 2012-10-25) [no 
page].   
8
Lodge, T “Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflict in Africa” April 1999 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No36/ArmedConflict.html (accessed 2012-11-14) [no page]. 
9
Ibid.  
10
Ibid.  
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continuation of armed conflict for thirty years and a religious war was seen in Algeria in 
1992.11 An example of state collapse was demonstrated in countries such as Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, where the countries‟ economies were weakened by a decades of corrupt 
governments.12 Border clashes were evident in the disputes between Cameroon and 
Nigeria, Namibia and Botswana, and in Eritrea.13 In several countries, the anti-colonial 
struggles have also played a role in the rise of armed conflicts. 
In dealing with the cited crimes, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda14 was 
established in 1994, under the UN Security Council resolution 955.15 The tribunal was 
created to address the Rwandan Genocide that involved the Hutus slaughtering the Tutsis 
and killed up to a million people.16 The genocide began in April 1994 with the death of the 
Rwandan president.17 This ignited systematic massacres and led to the start of attacks by 
members of the presidential guards against the Tutsi civilians in Kigali.18 In less than half an 
hour after the plane crash, roadblocks were created and manned by Hutu militias for 
purpose of identification of the Tutsis.19 An estimation of 150,000 to 251,000 women were 
raped and killings continued until July 1994.20 Government officials, soldiers and militia who 
had taken part in the genocide fled to DRC along with 1.4 million civilians who feared to 
remain in Rwanda.21 At the camps, thousands died of water borne diseases and further the 
camps were used by former Rwandan government soldiers to re-arm and stage an invasion 
in Rwanda.22 These activities further contributed to an armed conflict between Rwanda and 
the DRC in 1996.23 The former Rwandan government soldiers continue to operate in the 
DRC alongside the Congolese militia and other militias targeting civilian population.24  
The ICTR was established through a statute aimed at prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
                                                             
11
Lodge, T “Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflict in Africa” April 1999 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No36/ArmedConflict.html (accessed 2012-11-14) [no page].  
12
Ibid. 
13
Ibid. 
14
Hereafter referred to ICTR. 
15
ICTR “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda” no date http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ICTR.html (accessed 
2012-5-7) [no page]. 
16
Ibid. 
17
UN “Brief History of the Country “ no date 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocie/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml (accessed 2012-11-08) [no page].  
18
Ibid. 
19
Ibid. 
20
Ibid. 
21
Ibid. 
22
Ibid. 
23UN “Brief History of the Country “ no date 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocie/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml (accessed 2012-11-08) [no 
page].  
24
Ibid.  
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territory of Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December, 1994.25 It further addressed the 
prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of neighbouring states.26  
In 2000, the Special Court for Sierra Leone,27 a mixed jurisdiction of international and 
national components creating a hybrid system of justice was established to address 
international humanitarian law violations committed during the civil war in the Sierra Leonean 
territory.28 It was based on an agreement between the UN Security Council and the 
government of Sierra Leone under the adopted Resolution 1315.29 This court offered a 
different judicial model in comparison to the ICTR as it consisted of domestic and 
international systems addressing individuals who allegedly bore “greatest responsibility” for 
crimes committed during the armed conflict.30 The court operates separately from of the 
Sierra Leone domestic judicial system, and the Statute of the SCSL draws its principle from 
international humanitarian law and limited amount of domestic criminal law.31 The Statute 
addresses the prosecution of crimes against humanity, violations of Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.32 With 
regard to the latter, the court has developed a novel jurisprudence by criminalizing the use of 
child soldiers, and the prosecutor is attempting to charge forced marriage as a crime against 
humanity.33  
Sierra Leone suffered a civil war where approximately ten thousand people were killed and 
abuses against civilians committed in an eleven year armed conflict.34 During the armed 
conflict, the rebel groups known as the Revolutionary United Front35 and Armed Forces 
                                                             
25
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (hereafter referred to as Statute of ICTR).  
26
ICTR “General information” no date http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx 
(accessed 2012-10-22) [no page]. 
27
Statute of Special Court for Sierra Leone ; Having been established by an Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 16 January 
2002 (hhereafter referred to as Statute of SCSL). 
28
Raub, L “Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice” no date 
http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Raub_Positioning_hybrid_tribunals.pdf   (accessed 2012-9-9) [1034]. 
29
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000. 
30
Kendall, S and Staggs, M “From Mandate to Legacy: the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a Model for “Hybrid 
Justice” April 2005 http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Papers/BWCSC%20Interim%20Report%20on%20the%20Special%20Court%20for%20Sierra%2
0Leone.pdf  (accessed 2012-11-12) [2]. 
31
Ibid. 
32
Ibid. 
33
Kendall, S and Staggs, M “From Mandate to Legacy: the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a Model for “Hybrid 
Justice” April 2005 http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Papers/BWCSC%20Interim%20Report%20on%20the%20Special%20Court%20for%20Sierra%2
0Leone.pdf (accessed 2012-11-12) [2]. 
34
Ibid. 
35
Hereafter referred to as RUF. 
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Revolutionary Council fought against the government and government backed militias.36 The 
civilian population was targeted by three fractions engaged in atrocities.37 The rebel groups 
started the war in 1991, using civilians as workforce during the entire armed conflict.38 
Thousands of civilians suffered amputations, mutilations, acts of sexual violence, mass 
killing, abduction and forced recruitment into armed groups, the use of children as 
combatants, and the exploitation of Sierra Leone‟s diamond reserves to finance the war.39 
Chopping of limbs and sexual violence were used as a tool of terror and control.40 In the 
resolution 1315, the UN Security Council expressed its concern at the “serious crimes 
committed within the territory of Sierra Leone against the people of Sierra Leone and United 
Nations and associated personnel and at the prevailing situation of impunity” and insisted 
that those who committed such crimes were individually responsible.41 In addition, 
Resolution 1260 of 20 August 1999 welcomed the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement 
ending years of fighting in Sierra Leone which in addition, included amnesty provisions.42  
The indictment issued in 2003 against Charles Taylor, a former head of state for Liberia for 
atrocities allegedly committed during the Sierra Leone conflict was the first indictment issued 
by the court but raised serious concerns for regional peace and stability in West Africa.43 
Taylor was transferred to The Hague rather than Free Town, Sierra Leone, for security 
reasons although whether there were other agendas attached to the transfer were 
questioned.44  
                                                             
36
Kamara, J “Preserving the Legacy of the Special Court of Sierra Leone: Challenges and Lessons Learned in 
Prosecuting Grave Crimes in Sierra Leone” no date 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Presrving_the_Legacy_of_the_Special_Court_-Grotius_lecture.pdf (accessed 
2012-11-12) [3]. 
37
Kendall, S and Staggs, M “From Mandate to Legacy: the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a Model for “Hybrid 
Justice” April 2005 http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Papers/BWCSC%20Interim%20Report%20on%20the%20Special%20Court%20for%20Sierra%2
0Leone.pdf  (accessed 2012-11-12) [2]. 
38
Kamara, J “Preserving the Legacy of the Special Court of Sierra Leone: Challenges and Lessons Learned in 
Prosecuting Grave Crimes in Sierra Leone” no date 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Presrving_the_Legacy_of_the_Special_Court_-Grotius_lecture.pdf (accessed 
2012-11-12) [3]. 
39Kendall, S and Staggs, M “From Mandate to Legacy: the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a Model for 
“Hybrid Justice” April 2005 http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Papers/BWCSC%20Interim%20Report%20on%20the%20Special%20Court%20for%20Sierra%2
0Leone.pdf (accessed 2012-11-12) [2]. 
40
Kamara, J “Preserving the Legacy of the Special Court of Sierra Leone: Challenges and Lessons Learned in 
Prosecuting Grave Crimes in Sierra Leone” no date 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Presrving_the_Legacy_of_the_Special_Court_-Grotius_lecture.pdf (accessed 
2012-11-12) [4]. 
41
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000. 
42
Mcdonuld, A “Sierra Leone‟s Shoestring Special Court” March 2002 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/121-144-mcdonald.pdf (accessed 2012-6-5) [123].  
43
University of Witswatersrand School of law “Africa and The Future of the International Criminal Justice” July 
2010 http://www.asil.org/files/africaigcallforpapers.pdf (accessed 2012-9-21) [2]. 
44
University of Witswatersrand School of law “Africa and The Future of the International Criminal Justice” July 
2010 http://www.asil.org/files/africaigcallforpapers.pdf (accessed 2012-9-21) [2]. 
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African states have demonstrated their intention to hold those accountable for the gravest 
International crimes. The efforts to fight impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes resulted in the creation of a permanent ICC by adopting the Rome Statute45 in 
1998 and the court coming into force in 2002 with overwhelming support from Africa.46 
Supporters of the ICC argue that the court was created with intention of addressing serious 
and heinous crimes condemned universally but critics of the ICC disagree and argue that 
serious crimes can be understood differently by different legal systems.47  In the past years, 
the relationship between Africa and ICC has strained. A number of critics have accused ICC 
of using Africa as guinea pigs, and the majority of African states disapproved the ICC 
indictment against president Omar al-Bashir of Sudan.48 In addition, the African Union urged 
its members not to cooperate with the indictment issued by the ICC, further weakening the 
ability of the court.49 Support and cooperation by the ICC state parties are vital for the court 
because having no enforcement mechanism, the court depends heavily on state cooperation 
to operate. 
Other courts in the African region are the merged African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, formed to address human rights violations in the African continent50 and the 
Southern Africa Development Community Tribunal51 which was created to enhance co-
operation between member states and further to settle disputes of states and legal 
persons.52 These courts do not address individual criminal responsibility for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide. 
The treatise addresses the possible creation of an African criminal court for individual 
criminal responsibility for crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by 
critically analysing the existing statutes and their protocols that create the cited courts. 
Attention is paid to provisions addressing the three crimes cited, individual criminal 
responsibility as opposed to state responsibility, principle of jurisdiction, and concept of 
immunity and amnesty in relation to the proposed African criminal court. This is followed by 
an examination of challenges faced by the cited courts in relation to provisions stated and 
                                                             
45
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  of 1 July 2002. 
46
Williamson, J  “Overview of the International Criminal Jurisdiction Operating in Africa” March 2006 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_861_williamson.pdf (accessed 2012-10-25) [112].  
47
Driscoll, Zompetti, and Zompetti the International Criminal Court Global Politics and the Quest for Justice (2004) 
14. 
48
Du Plessis, M “The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants” no date 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4627~v~The_International_Criminal_Court_that_Africa_wants.
pdf (accessed 2012-3-1) [14].  
49
Ibid. 
50
Article 1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights of 1 July 2008. 
51
Hereafter referred to SADC Tribunal. 
52
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community of  30 September 1993 and Protocol on the Tribunal 
and Rules of the Procedures Thereof of 18 August 2005. 
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makes recommendations to drafters to consider when creating African criminal court. The 
treatise further reviews other relevant international law that may be applicable.   
1 2 Genocide, Crimes against humanity and War crimes, as Reflected in the 
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
One of the main purposes of international humanitarian law53 is to prevent human suffering 
during armed conflict. IHL rules have to be observed at all times and violation of the law 
could amount to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These crimes are 
addressed in the Statute of the ICTR, SCSL, and the Rome Statute. These crimes are 
regarded by the international community as the most serious crimes.54  
Genocide has been practised for centuries.55 In 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted 
resolution 96 (1) declaring genocide an international crime in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.56 The Convention places individual 
criminal responsibility on all those liable for such crimes.57 In addition, the crime is further 
prohibited under customary international law.58 
The definition of genocide is addressed in article 2 of the Statute of the ICTR,59 the 
Genocide Convention,60 and article 6 of the Rome Statute.61 The definitions appearing in 
these instruments are similar and include: 
“[A]cts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such; 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
     physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
62
 
Although the elements prescribed in Statute of the ICTR and the Genocide Convention are 
similar to those of the Rome Statute, the former include additional provisions which are 
“conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to 
                                                             
53
Hereafter referred to as IHL.  
54
Werle Principles of International Criminal Law 2ed (2009) 29. 
55
Aust Handbook for International Law 2ed (2010) 251.         
56
Ibid.       
57
Article IV on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948. 
58
Aust Handbook for International Law 252.       
59
Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTR. 
60
Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948. 
61
Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1 July 2002. 
62
Supra footnote 19, 20, and 21. 
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commit genocide and complicity in genocide.”63 The Statute of the SCSL does not address 
genocide because it was believed that such acts were not committed during the civil war. In 
relation to crimes against humanity, article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR, article 2 of the 
Statute of SCSL, and article 7 of the Rome Statute provide similar elements and include:  
“[A]cts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement;  
(d) Deportation;  
(e) Imprisonment; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape; 
(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;”
64
 
The Rome Statute further extends the definition to also include: 
“(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;  
 (j) The crime of apartheid;  
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health.”
65
  
In addition, article 7 (2) of the Rome Statute further provides a broad definition of each 
element.66 Furthermore, the Rome Statute and the Statute of the SCSL define the element of 
rape to include “sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization 
and/or any other form of sexual violence.”67  
War crimes are serious violations of laws and customs applicable in armed conflict which 
give rise to individual criminal responsibility.68 Unlike crimes against humanity, war crimes 
have no requirement for systematic commission.69 A single isolated act can amount to war 
crime and is also prohibited under customary international law.70 An example given by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal held that key provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations reflected 
customary law therefore violations amounted to war crimes, even though the Hague 
Regulations did not expressly criminalize such violations.71 In addition, not all violations 
committed during war amount to war crimes.72 If the atrocities are committed post conflict, 
                                                             
63
Supra footnote 19 and 20. 
64
Article 3 of Statute of ICTR, article 2 of  SCSL, article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
65
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
66
Article 7 (2) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
67
Article 7 of the Rome Statute and article 2 of SCSL. 
68
Cryer, Friman, Robinson, and Wilmshurst  Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2007) 267.  
69
Cryer et al Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure  267.   
70
Ibid.  
71
Cryer et al Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 269.  
72
Cryer et al Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 272.  
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they are prosecuted as genocide or crimes against humanity and not war crimes.73 War 
crimes further have general requirements under international law which include: 
 Existence of an armed conflict (international or non-international armed conflict);  
 A link must be established between the impugned act and the conflict; and  
 The accused must have knowledge of the armed conflict (aware of factual 
circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict that is the mental 
element).74  
In its first significant ruling, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY declared that: 
“„[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or 
between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of 
such armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until…in the case of internal 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is reached.‟” 
The nexus or link is the element of the offence where the burden of proof lies with the 
prosecutor. According to the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR:  
“„The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the 
existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the 
perpetrator‟s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed 
or the purpose for which it was committed . . . In determining whether or not the act in question 
related to the armed conflict, the Trial Chamber may take into account . . . the following factors: 
the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant; the fact 
that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said to serve the 
ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the 
context of the perpetrator‟s official duties.‟”
75
  
The Nuremberg Charter further defines war crimes in article 6 (b) as violations of the laws or 
customs of war.76 As war crimes are serious violations of IHL it is therefore necessary to 
refer to the relevant principles of IHL when interpreting international criminal law.77 This is 
evident in articles 8(2) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute which refers to the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions.78 In addition, war crimes are linked with grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions in articles 50 of GC1, 51 of GCII, 130 of GCIII, 147 of GC IV and Common 
Article 3; they form part of customary international law.79 The grave breaches in Additional 
Protocol I have not attained customary status.80  
                                                             
73
Schabas the UN international Criminal Tribunals: the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 1ed (2006) 
229. 
74
Ibid. 
75
Schabas the UN International Criminal Tribunals 229. 
76
Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 (hereafter referred to as IMT). 
77
Cryer et al Introduction  to International Criminal Law and Procedure 273.  
78
Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
79
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The Rome Statute gives a broad and comprehensive list of war crimes (unlike the other 
statutes). This list has been criticised by ICC critics for failure to include all war crimes 
recognized in customary law; for example the prohibition on the use of chemical or biological 
weapons.81 In addition, critics of the ICC argue that this crime is not carefully defined for 
example “the committing of outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment” is vague and nullifies the validity of the statute.82 Article 8(2) (a)  of the 
Rome Statute defines war crimes as crimes “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part 
of a large-scale commission” and further includes “[g]rave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or 
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: 
 (i) Wilful killing;  
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;  
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;  
(iv)Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;  
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile 
Power;  
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular 
trial;  
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;  
(viii)Taking of hostages.”
83
 
War crimes are further linked with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in relation 
to a non-international armed conflict as stated in article 8 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute which 
states:  
i. “Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; 
ii. Taking of hostages; 
iii. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
iv. The passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilised people.”
84
 
The violation of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II is 
further prohibited by the Statute of the SCSL,85 and the Statute of the ICTR86.  Article 3 of 
the Statute of SCSL, places a limitation on the violations listed, unlike Article 4 of the Statute 
of the ICTR, which gives a broad list of violations without limitation.87  
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Attention is paid to individual criminal responsibility as opposed to state responsibility for 
criminal acts. The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
and SADC Tribunal only deal with state responsibility. State responsibility for international 
wrongful acts is addressed by the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of the States for International Wrongful acts.88 
In the Rome Statute, individual criminal responsibility is firstly defined in article 1.89 The 
principle is further extensively defined in article 25 which states that a person will be 
individually responsible if that person individually or jointly or through an order of another 
commits, or attempts to commit, such crime by ordering, soliciting, inducing, abetting, aiding 
and assisting the commission thereof.90 In addition, the Statute of the ICTR and SCSL 
defines individual criminal responsibility as:  
“[A] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present 
Statute.”
91
  
The two statutes supported by the Rome Statute further state the official position of any 
accused shall not bar the accused from prosecution or the cited acts committed by a 
subordinate shall not prevent the superior from prosecution.92  
Attention shall also be paid to the principle of jurisdiction as reflected in the Statute of the 
SCSL, ICTR, the Rome Statute and any applicable international law. A similar characteristic 
common in the cited statutes is the limitation on the territorial jurisdiction, for example; the 
Statute of the ICTR only applies in the Rwandan territory. Temporal jurisdiction is also 
evident in the cited Statutes for example, the Statute of the SCSL‟s scope relates to crimes 
committed from 30 November 1996 to a date to be determined by an agreement between 
the parties.93 Furthermore, there is no mention of jurisdiction for criminal prosecution for 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes in the Protocol and Statute of the SADC 
tribunal. 
The jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is aimed specifically at 
human rights matters, with no mention to criminal matters. However, Ministers of Justice and 
Attorney General of the African Union94 met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2012 to discuss 
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the possible extension of the court‟s jurisdiction to include genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.95  
The meeting led to the adoption of the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.96 The objectives set out herein 
include adding international criminal jurisdiction to the court‟s scope and making structural 
amendments.97 Currently the Draft Protocol waits for approval from Executive Council, 
Assembly of Heads of states, governments and is before the Assembly of the African Union 
for formal adoption and signature.98 To date, the process been a slow one.99  
In relation to the jurisdiction of the ICC, it only applies to states that are party to the 
statute.100 Moreover, a problem may arise when the cited crimes are committed by 
individuals from a country not party to the Rome statute. The Rome statute empowers the 
United Nations Security Council to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation if the 
court does not have jurisdiction.101 This means that without a referral from the UN Security 
Council, the ICC lacks universal jurisdiction.102 If an arrest warrant is issued by the ICC, it will 
depend on the cooperation of states for enforcement. Cooperation with the ICC is not always 
possible as evident in the indictment against president al-Bashir of Sudan where various 
African countries refused to cooperate with the court in arresting al-Bashir.103  
 With respect to the proposed African criminal court, its jurisdiction should not be limited as 
shown in the above courts. Its territorial jurisdiction will depend on whether the court is treaty 
based or UN based. The SCSL and the ICTR are UN based whereas the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, ICC, SADC Tribunal are treaty based therefore not all African 
states are parties to the treaties. A court being UN based is created for a specific period and 
for a specific purpose. 
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Attention is further paid to the provisions addressing immunity and amnesty as reflected in 
the Statute of the SCSL, Statute for the ICTR, and Rome Statute. In addition, issues 
pertaining to the validity, applicability of immunity, and amnesty granted to a perpetrator who 
has committed serious international crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian 
law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in cases where international 
courts and tribunals are faced with a duty to prosecute. The Statute of SCSL deals with 
amnesty in article 10104 whereas Rome Statute and Statute of the ICTR defines immunity in 
articles 29 of the ICTR statute,105 and 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute.106 The Statute of 
SCSL does not specifically provide provisions relating to immunity; and the same applies to 
the Rome Statute and Statute of the ICTR in relation to amnesty thus making the 
applicability the two principles unclear. 
The provisions of articles 27 and 98(1) addressing immunity appear to be in conflict with 
each other. Article 27 makes it clear that personal and functional immunity do not apply 
against a sitting head of state, but Article 98 provides that a state is not forced to surrender 
an individual to the court if doing so would be inconsistent with diplomatic immunity.107 These 
are some of the issues the treatise will be addressing. 
Therefore, the main research question is whether Africa needs a separate criminal court for 
individual criminal responsibility for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This 
will be addressed by analysing the Statutes of the ICTR, SCSL and Rome Statute of the 
ICC. The concept of individual criminal responsibility is looked at because currently there is 
no criminal court in force in Africa dealing with this as focus is on state responsibility for 
human rights violations. Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are commonly 
committed in armed conflicts that are mainly found in Africa. Examples of where such crimes 
have been committed are in the Sudan and DRC armed conflicts. In most cases, majority of 
African legal systems are weak and unable to prosecute. The idea of a separate criminal 
court is also partly as a result of the tension between the ICC and some African states. In 
analysing the Statute of the ICTR, SCSL and Rome Statute, specific provisions of the 
statutes shall be looked at in relation to the topic. 
1 3 Methodology 
Methods that will be used in this treatise for data collection will be internet sources with 
reference to official websites, library research for primary and secondary sources such as 
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case law, journals, books and applicable international instruments. A critical analysis of 
different statutes and protocols shall be made in relation to the topic.  
1 4 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter one shall consist of an introduction discussing briefly the chapters of the treatise, 
detailing the problem statement and the method that shall be used. Definition of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes shall be given in terms of Genocide Convention, 
Statute of the ICTR, SCSL and the Rome Statute. A further analysis shall be made to show 
how these crimes are a violation of international humanitarian law, international criminal law 
and any other applicable international law. In addition, a brief discussion of each chapter 
shall follow. 
Chapter two will critically discuss the concept of individual criminal responsibility as opposed 
to state responsibility by looking at the provisions of article 6 of SCSL and ICTR and articles 
1 and 25 of the Rome Statute. The Protocol and the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights and Statute and Protocol of the SADC Tribunal that suggest state 
responsibility shall also be looked at in relation to the creation an African criminal court. 
Attention shall also be paid to other international law applicable.   
Chapter three shall provide a critical discussion on the provisions addressing jurisdiction 
specifically looking at articles 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 17 of the Rome Statute, articles 1, 2, 3, and 
4 of the Statute of SCSL and ICTR, articles 5 and 32 of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal, 
articles 14 and 15 of Protocol on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
and any other relevant international law that is applicable. A shift away from the SADC 
Tribunal and Protocol on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights shall be 
seen as they do not deal with criminal matters in relation to the topic. 
Attention will be given to issues pertaining to the validity and applicability of immunity and 
amnesty in Chapter four, granted to a perpetrator who has committed serious international 
crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes especially where there is a duty to prosecute. 
Chapter five discusses the legal implications arising from the Draft Protocol on Amendments 
to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights on 
international, regional, and domestic level. The addresses this because it involves extending 
criminal jurisdiction to an existing court that was not initially created for that purpose. A 
determination is made from this chapter as to whether Africa can accommodate its own court 
with criminal jurisdiction by analysing the Draft Protocol.   
14 
 
A critical discussion on the provisions relating to amnesty and immunity provided for in the 
Statute of SCSL, Rome Statute of the ICC, Statute of the ICTR, and any other relevant 
international law and related case law dealing with immunity and amnesty follows.  Attention 
will be paid on immunity from prosecution granted to an individual accused such as a state 
official in relation to international crimes before the international court and tribunals.  
Chapter six shall deal with the conclusion and provide recommendations if any. This chapter 
will discuss whether Africa needs a separate regional criminal court or not in relation to the 
strength and weaknesses of the already existing courts in the region taking into account the 
specific provisions (the three crimes, individual criminal responsibility, jurisdiction, and 
amnesty and immunity). 
1 5 Conclusion  
The treatise proposes the creation of an African criminal court as Africa does not have a 
continental criminal court. Armed conflicts leading to the violation of international crimes are 
too common in Africa where a culture of impunity has become the norm. The majority of the 
African national legal systems are weak therefore, failing to prosecute those accountable. 
Despite the availability of the ICC, its involvement in Africa has had a devastating effect on 
the damaged relationship between the court and the continent. 
Notwithstanding the formation of a number of courts in Africa, they have limited territorial and 
temporal jurisdiction. The treatise will further indicate whether Africa needs a separate 
criminal court. The treatise refers to specific provisions because this is where the mentioned 
courts are facing challenges. 
The next chapter critically addresses the principles of individual criminal responsibility as 
reflected in the Statute of the ICTR, SCSL and the Rome Statute. In addition, attention will 
be paid to any relevant international law applicable. 
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Chapter Two 
The Concept of Individual Criminal Responsibility as reflected in the Statutes 
of Ad-hoc Tribunals and International Criminal Court. 
2 1 Introduction 
Africa does not have a continental criminal court and national courts are neither well 
prepared nor willing to deal with individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.108 
These crimes may be referred to either the ICC if jurisdiction exists, or to an ad-hoc 
international tribunal created by the relevant state to hold individuals accountable or 
crimes.109 The latter was the case in formation of the ICTR and SCSL.110  
 In this chapter, individual criminal responsibility in terms of international law and customary 
international law is examined, and a brief background relating to the evolution of the principle 
is supplied. This is followed by a critically analysis the  provisions regarding individual 
criminal responsibility in terms of the Rome Statute, Statute of the ICTR, and Statute of the 
SCSL opposed to state responsibility for criminal acts. In addition, the Protocol regarding the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and Treaty and Protocol of the 
SADC Tribunal is examined in relation individual criminal responsibility. 
Individual criminal responsibility is an important area to look at in relation to the creation of 
an African criminal court because the existing statutes of courts in Africa focuses on state 
responsibility and are human rights based. The only statutes dealing with individual criminal 
responsibility are those of the ICTR, SCSL, and Rome Statute. It should be noted that the 
ICTR and SCSL are not accessible to all African states as they are limited by territories, and 
the Rome Statute is only applicable to states are that are party to it. Therefore, it is 
necessary to critically analyse the provisions on individual criminal responsibility provided for 
by the Statutes of the ICTR, SCSL, and Rome Statute and how useful they may be in the 
creation of an African criminal court. 
2 2 Individual Criminal Responsibility in terms of International Law 
International criminal law addresses individual criminal responsibility as opposed to state 
responsibility.111 Crimes under international law are committed by individuals.112 State 
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responsibility aims to restore a situation in order to conform to international law and all 
violations attributable to the state create state responsibility.113 
After the First World War, the Allied powers formed a commission tasked with investigating 
war crimes.114 This commission recommended the high-ranking Axis officials who violated 
the laws of war be prosecuted for ordering such crimes on the basis of command 
responsibility.115 A further suggestion was also made that an Allied High Tribunal be 
established to try individuals for violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of 
humanity.116 In addition, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 noted that the German government 
recognised the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring individuals accused of 
crimes against the laws and customs of war before military tribunals.117 
The true starting point for individual criminal responsibility was with the International Criminal 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.118 This legal instrument provided general requirements in a 
binding manner for individual criminal responsibility for certain crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.119 It further dealt with the early stages of planning and 
preparations and included government officials in the definition.120 The provisions of the 
Nuremberg Charter are regarded as part of international law, since the General Assembly 
affirmed the principles of the Charter and the decisions of the Tribunal in 1946.121 
Furthermore, the International Law Commission122 formulated a Draft Code of Crimes 
against Peace and Security of Mankind.123 The code contains provisions regarding individual 
criminal responsibility, particularly by requiring intention, prohibiting both the ordering of the 
crime and the superior‟s failure to prevent it.124 In addition, the code defines the concept of 
instigation, aiding and abetting.125     
In terms of rule 51 of customary international humanitarian law, individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes is regarded as a norm of customary international law applicable 
in international and no-international armed conflicts.126  
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Moreover, the study on customary international humanitarian law prepared by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross127 concluded that individual criminal responsibility 
extends to commanders and other superiors.128 Superiors are criminally liable for crimes 
committed by their subordinates if they knew or had a reason to know that these persons 
were committing or intending to commit such crimes, and failed to take reasonable 
measures to prevent or punish those responsible.129 The ICRC study affirmed that this rule 
forms part of customary international law is applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflicts.130  
In addition, the doctrine of superior responsibility is codified in articles 86 and 87 of 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.131 Articles 86 establishes the obligation of 
state parties to prevent grave breaches of the Additional Protocol I that may take place due 
to failure to act, especially when the law requires the party to do so. The superior can 
therefore only be held liable if failure to take action against the subordinate occurs when a 
duty to act existed.132 Article 87 requires the military commanders to control and prevent, 
and suppress and report breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I where 
possible.133 At international level, individual criminal responsibility has been questioned by 
international criminal law development, especially where theories of command responsibility 
and joint criminal enterprise are taking centre stage.134 These theories have also been 
criticised by international criminal scholars as being over expansive.135 
2 3  Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Statute of Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is laid down in the Statutes of the ICTR, 
SCSL, and the Rome Statute.136 These Statutes focus on individual criminal responsibility as 
opposed to state responsibility, although the Rome Statute does emphasise that the 
                                                             
127
Hereafter referred to as ICRC. 
128
Boas, Bischoff, and Reid International Criminal Law Practitioner Library (2011) 143.   
129
Ibid. 
130
Boas, Bischoff, and Reid International Criminal Law Practitioner Library (2011) 143.   
131
Articles 86 and 87 of  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1978.   
132
Article 86(1) and (2) of Protocol I. 
133
Article 87 (1) of Protocol I. 
134
Ogetto, K “Some Challenges of Defending International Criminal Suspects” no date 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Kennedy_Ogetto_some_challenges_of_defending_international_crime
_suspects.pdf (accessed 2012-7-26) [12]. 
135
Ibid. 
136
Articles 6 of the Statute of the ICTR and SCSL and article 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
18 
 
provisions on individual criminal responsibility shall not affect the responsibility of the state in 
terms of international law.137 
This principle is first defined in the Statute of SCSL, which states that the court has power to 
prosecute those “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law”.138 Similarly, the Statute of the ICTR 
empowers the tribunal “to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law”.139 However in terms of these articles, the Statute of SCSL 
fails to define “persons who bear the greatest responsibility” and Statute of ICTR also fails to 
define the “persons responsible”.  
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is further reflected in article 6140 of the 
Statute of the SCSL and ICTR. Article 6 (1) defines and shows who may be held liable for 
individual criminal responsibility:  
“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of crime.”
141
 
With regard to individual criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL set 
specific requirements under article 6 (1) of the Statute of SCSL that entail that the violation 
must constitute:  
 An infringement of the rules of international humanitarian law;  
 The rule infringed must be customary in nature or part of treaty law;  
 The violation must be serious in nature that is breach of rules defending important 
values;   
 The consequences of the breach must grossly affect the victim; and  
 Under customary law or conventional law, the violation must entail the person 
breaching laws relating to individual criminal responsibility.142  
These requirements were applied in the case of Charles Taylor who was charged for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.143 The trial was held at The Hague due to security 
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threat in Sierra Leone, and in April 2012, Taylor was found guilty of the charges by the Trial 
Chamber of SCSL.144 
Paragraphs two and three of article 6 refer to the doctrine of command responsibility, also 
known as superior responsibility.145 These paragraphs state that the official position of the 
accused person shall not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility, and a crime 
committed by a subordinate does not exclude the superior of criminal responsibility if the 
superior was aware or had reason to believe that the subordinate intended to commit a 
crime, and the superior failed to take reasonable actions.146  
The Statute of the SCSL makes no distinction between military and civilian superiors.147 To 
date, however, the pleading practice of the special prosecutor and the decisions of the Trial 
Chambers have not taken a clear position on the content or scope of superior responsibil ity, 
nor added much to the relevance of international jurisprudence.148  
Establishing individual criminal responsibility where a person did not participate in the actual 
commission of the crime cited is one of the biggest challenges faced by the ICTR and relates 
to for example, the investigation and prosecution of military and political leaders.149   
In terms of the ICTR and as highlighted in Prosecutor v Bagilishema, to be convicted under 
command or superior responsibility the following elements must be present:150  
 A superior-subordinate relationship must exist where the accused was the superior of 
the subordinate of whom the accused had effective control. Effective control entails 
the accused (superior) to have the material ability to prevent or punish the 
subordinate‟s crimes and those alleged crimes the accused is charged with;  
 The accused must have been aware of or must have had reasons to believe that the 
subordinates were intending to commit or had committed the crimes; and  
 The accused must have failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent or punish those responsible.  
The elements prescribed by the ICTR are similar to those prescribed by the SCSL with 
respect to article 6 (3). 
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The ICTR has further held that the doctrine of command or superior responsibility must not 
be taken as criminal negligence when applied to non-military superiors. Moreover, this was 
upheld in Bagilishema151 case where the Trial Chamber further emphasised that, as 
opposed to liability based on mere negligence, a superior or commander is held criminally 
liable of his subordinates‟ crimes for deliberately failing to perform his duties as a superior or 
commander, or for culpably or wilfully ignoring them despite having knowledge of 
subordinates‟ conducts.152 In addition, the Statute of the SCSL deals with joint criminal 
enterprise which is also known as „common purpose‟ or „common plan liability‟, and also 
linked to article 6 of the Statute. The prosecutor has to prove:  
 a common plan by a group of people, designed to commit a crime; and  
 That the accused participated and had intention in the joint common plan.153  
The above elements are similar to those of the ICTR. The concept of joint criminal enterprise 
finds its basis in article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR, although it is not clearly stated. The 
ICTR prosecutor has been slow to incorporate clear charges of joint criminal enterprise 
participation into the indictments of the accused before the tribunal. Consequently, only a 
few ICTR Chambers have pronounced the applicability of the doctrine.154 The Trial Chamber 
in Prosecutor v Ntagerura held that where prosecution intends to rely on the joint criminal 
enterprise, the purpose and category, the parties involved and the parties‟ roles must be 
stated unambiguously in the indictment.155 In this case, the prosecution failed to comply with 
these requirements and the court refused to consider the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise.156 This was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.157   
In the RUF158 trial of the SCSL, the accused were charged of number of crimes related to 
joint criminal enterprise.159 The Trial Chamber found the three accused liable for every crime 
they were accused of in relation to the territory of Sierra Leone committed over a period of 
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one year.160 International criminal law scholars criticised this case based in light of the 
element of unfairness present, as the three accused were charged with identical conduct 
without any attempt made in specifying how each accused contributed to the joint criminal 
enterprise.161 
In the judgement, little attempt was made to explain how the accused contributed to the 
crimes.162 The judgement stated only that their conducts or omissions fell under the definition 
of joint criminal enterprise and that they were individually liable in terms of article 6 (1) of the 
Statute.163 The judgment of the Trial Chamber further discussed crimes committed by 
unidentified rebels and other persons without any link to the accused and briefly concluded 
that the accused were liable for the crimes listed.164  
Individual criminal responsibility is also specifically defined under the Rome Statute. The 
Rome Statute gives a broader, comprehensive framework of prosecuting individuals liable 
for crimes listed therein.165 This principle is evident in articles 1 and 25, which shows the 
breadth and analytical nature of the principle. Article 1166 states that the court has 
“jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international law” which may 
indicate individual criminal responsibility. This is supplemented by article 25,167 which 
provides a detailed analysis of individual criminal responsibility. In terms of article 25, a 
person will be individually responsible if that person individually or jointly or through an order 
of another commits, or attempts to commit, such crime by ordering, soliciting, inducing, 
abetting, aiding, and assisting in the commission thereof.168 The Rome Statute further 
includes a “group of persons acting with a common purpose” in the definition of individual 
criminal responsibility. 169  
Article 27 of the Rome Statute renders the official capacity of the accused irrelevant. 
Therefore, a head of state, member of government or parliament, or an elected official is not 
exempted from criminal responsibility.170 The same is applicable to military commanders, or 
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persons effectively acting as military commanders, as provided by the Rome Statute171 and 
the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols.172 A plea of superior order shall also 
not exempt a person from criminal responsibility, unless that person was legally obliged to 
obey orders and was unaware that the order was unlawful.173 The individual criminal 
responsibility of a person under the age of eighteen; a mental disabled person; a person in a 
state of intoxication; a person acting under self defence; or a person acting under duress 
from threat of death is excluded by the Statute.174  
There is no individual criminal responsibility for a person‟s conduct that does not constitute a 
crime under the statute at the time it was committed or it was committed before the court 
came into force.175 Moreover, the ICC also has the power to prosecute individual criminals 
taking part in an internal armed conflict.176 The principle defined in article 25 acts as a 
foundation for and limitation of international criminal responsibility in order to establish 
international law as a tool of justice, not a tool of oppression.177  
2 4 Treaty and Protocol of the SADC Tribunal and the Protocol and Statute on 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
In terms of the Protocol of the SADC Tribunal, provisions on individual and state 
responsibility become evident when a dispute arises “between states and between natural or 
legal persons and states”.178 This indicates that it is concerned with civil matters and it is 
unclear whether criminal matters in relation to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, fall under this definition. 
In the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the principle 
of individual and state responsibility are not stated, but a clear emphasis is placed on the 
protection of human rights in the preamble,179 and a separate section in the statute is 
created for human rights matters.180 The Statute does provide a section that deals with 
general affairs, but there is no mention of criminal matters, making the section unclear.181  
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The responsibility on the state that may arise with respect to African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights in relation to criminal matters is for the responsible state to provide a remedy 
for the victims that have suffered harm as a result of the alleged criminal conduct.182 Some 
guidelines are proposed by the ILC‟s Draft Articles183 on State responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts. These guidelines are highly influential but not legally binding, 
and it should be noted that the Draft Articles do not deal with individual criminal 
responsibility.184   
2 5 Conclusion  
The doctrine of command responsibility is designed to hold both sides to an armed conflict 
accountable for international crimes.185 It allows liability where the perpetrator is a military 
commander or civilian, and the commander or civilian may not use official position as a form 
of defence.186 In addition, this doctrine is incorporated in the Statute of the ICTR, SCSL and 
Rome Statute. 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility broadly defined by the statutes mentioned, 
but these definitions face continued challenges from critics. Specifically, in the ICTR, 
individual criminal responsibility where a person did not commit the actual crime is one the 
most widely criticised aspects of this tribunal. Moreover, Rome Statute‟s failure to deal with 
criminal responsibility of the states poses challenges to international criminal law.187 
International Criminal liability should look beyond mere membership of an organisation, and 
suspects should not be punished simply for belonging to organisations with some members 
participating in criminal activities.188 This should be considered mostly in large-scale groups 
where individual member may have little control over the actions and/or conduct of other 
members.189 The provisions under the Statute and Protocol of SADC Tribunal and Protocol 
on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights are, therefore, not appropriate 
                                                             
182
United Nations General Assembly (Human Rights Council) “Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development” April 2009 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,,ANNUALREPORT,,4c06007d2,0.html (accessed 2012-5-
31) [no page]. 
183
International Law Commission‟ Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf  (accessed 2012-5-30).   
184
United Nations General Assembly (Human Rights Council) “Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development” April 2009 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,,ANNUALREPORT,,4c06007d2,0.html (accessed 2012-5-
31) [no page]. 
185
Singh “Command Responsibility of Military and Civilian Superiors: an Examination of International Judicial 
Decisions African” 2006 African Year Book on International Humanitarian Law 42 63. 
186
Ibid. 
187
Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 820. 
188
Ogetto, K “Some Challenges of Defending International Criminal Suspects” no date 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Kennedy_Ogetto_some_challenges_of_defending_international_crime
_suspects.pdf (accessed 2012-7-26) [23]. 
189
Ibid. 
24 
 
for the proposed African criminal court because of the nature these courts are human rights 
based.  
Additionally, the provisions relating to international law dealing with individual criminal 
responsibility, criticism from international criminal scholars regarding individual criminal 
responsibility, and challenges faced by the SCSL, ICC, and ICTR should also be taken into 
account. Special attention should be paid to command or superior responsibility in relation to 
creating an African criminal court. 
The following chapter addresses the provisions relating to jurisdiction provided by the 
Statute of the ICTR, SCSL, and Rome Statute of the ICC. A critical analysis of these 
provisions follows, taking into account the proposed establishment of an African criminal 
court.   
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Chapter Three 
Principle of Jurisdiction as it Applies in Terms of Ad-hoc tribunals and the ICC 
3 1 Introduction 
Armed conflicts leading to the violation of international humanitarian law are too common in 
the African continent. Attempts were made to hold the individuals responsible for 
international crimes through the work of the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ICC.190 The ICTR was 
the first court established to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes in the Rwandan territory.191  A request was then made by the Sierra Leonean 
government through an agreement with the UN and established a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. The SCSL‟s jurisdiction extended to both international and national crimes in the 
territory of Sierra Leone forming a hybrid court.192 Lastly, the ICC was created with the 
adoption of the Rome Statute. This court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes International Criminal Court was created having jurisdiction over 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and war crimes.193 
This chapter outlines and reviews the provisions on jurisdiction provided by the Statute of the 
ICTR, the Statute of the SCSL and Rome Statute of the ICC. A critical analysis of these 
provisions, taking into account the proposed establishment of an African criminal court, is 
included. In addition, the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal194 and Protocol on the Statute of 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights shall are critically examined in relation to 
jurisdiction.195 
3 2 Scope of Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
The ICTR‟s jurisdiction is reflected its statute. Article 1 of the statute empowers the ICTR to 
prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January and 31 
December, 1994, as well as Rwandan citizens responsible for violations committed in the 
territory of the neighbouring states.196  
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In terms of the above provision, there is a limitation on the territory, time and citizenship, 
which means the ICTR, is not accessible to all African states. Firstly, the ICTR jurisdiction is 
limited to Rwanda and neighbouring territories where Rwandan citizens committed 
violations. Secondly, with respect to time, the crimes must have been committed between 1 
January and 31 December 1994.197 The ICTR, therefore, has temporal jurisdiction, which is 
defined by the period when said crime was committed and territorial jurisdiction, which is 
defined by the territory in which the ICTR may exercise its jurisdiction.198 In addition, the 
ICTR also has jurisdiction over three categories of crimes, namely genocide, (specifically 
addressed in articles 1 and 2), crimes against humanity (addressed in article 3), and war 
crimes (addressed in article 4).199 This is discussed in Chapter one of this treatise. 
With respect to war crimes, violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (which 
addresses non-international armed conflict and prohibits violence to life, taking hostages, 
violation of a personal dignity, and passing out sentences and execution without a 
judgement)200 and Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention201 amounts to breach of 
Article 4 of the Statute of the ICTR.202 It appears as though article 4 of the Statute of ICTR 
was designed with non-international armed conflict in mind and, although the article does not 
limit the actions mentioned, it remains unclear whether an international armed conflict is 
included.203  In interpreting Common Article 3, the ICTR in the Akayesu case affirmed that 
the article formed part of customary international law.204 This view was also supported by an 
ICTY case.205 In addition, the ICTR also has jurisdiction over individual persons only as set 
out in article 5 of the Statute of the ICTR.206  
Articles 5 and 6, relating to individual criminal responsibility, are linked. Article 5 has 
personal jurisdiction to prosecute an individual or a group of people with a common purpose 
who is/are individually liable for the crime committed. The persons over whom the court may 
exercise jurisdiction are discussed in article 6.  
3 3 Scope of jurisdiction of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
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Similar to the ICTR, the SCSL has jurisdiction over persons who bear the “greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law.”207 The Statute SCSL similarly limits the jurisdiction of the court to crimes committed in 
the Sierra Leonean territory.208 Jurisdiction is further restricted to only “persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility”209 thus making it impossible for the SCSL to try other individuals who 
do not fall into these categories.210 
In addition, the court also has temporal jurisdiction as its scope relates to crimes committed 
from 30 November 1996 to a date to be determined by an agreement between the parties.211 
A number of authors find this provision unorthodox as the armed conflict in Sierra Leone 
begun in 1991, some Sierra Leoneans argued that the worst crimes were committed earlier 
than 1996.212 As a result of this restriction, punishment is unlikely for those responsible for 
abduction and recruitment of child soldier before 1996.213 
The Court also has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, serious violations of Article 3 
Common to the Geneva Conventions, a list of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, and a few selected aspects of Sierra Leonean law relating to the abuse of girls and 
arson.214 The crime of genocide is not dealt with under the Statute of SCSL as it was 
believed no genocide was committed during the civil war. The statute further excludes the 
grave breaches of Geneva Conventions in an international armed conflict.215Moreover, the 
SCSL lacks power to make rulings that are binding to third parties.216 It cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over personnel of the states that took part in peacekeeping operations in Sierra 
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Leone, except where the court is authorised to do so by the UN Security Council or where 
the state involved is unwilling or unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution against 
their personnel.217 
3 4 Scope of Jurisdiction in terms of the International Criminal Court 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is a combination of state a sovereignty-oriented system of 
jurisdiction based on the principle of territoriality and active personality, and the principle of 
complementarity218 reflected in the preamble,219 and article 1 of its statute.220  In terms of 
article 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the court has legal authority to determine 
jurisdictional and admissibility issues.221   
In terms of the principle of complementarity, the ICC is complementary to national courts and 
intervenes only when the national criminal jurisdiction is incapable of action or 
unavailable.222 Therefore, a national court acts as a court of first instance and the ICC as a 
court of last resort, thus placing a limitation on the ICC.223 This principle has been criticised 
for its abstract definition, which various authors feel may lead to confusion, placing the court 
at risk of being ineffective.224 
Article 17 declares judicial proceedings before the ICC permissible if and when state that 
would normally have jurisdiction is unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate or 
prosecute.225 A possible cause of a state‟s inability to investigate or prosecute crimes is 
ongoing armed conflict in the region226 The unwillingness and inability of African states to 
prosecute was demonstrated by the Democratic Republic of Congo‟s refusal to prosecute 
Katanga, accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes.227  Similarly, the Sudanese 
government refused to conduct an investigation into the alleged international crimes 
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committed in the Sudanese armed conflict.228 The unwillingness stated above may be either 
passive or active that is the state might openly refuse to conduct an investigation and/or 
prosecution of its own leaders, or might conduct an ineffective investigation deliberately, or 
show a trial with a predetermined outcome of innocence.229 In this scenario, the ICC can 
intervene and conduct a second trial of someone who has already been pronounced 
innocent by a domestic court.230 A number of critics of the ICC see this as a problem 
because the determination of effectiveness is made by the ICC itself therefore, despite the 
principle of complementarity, the ICC is still empowered to act as a superior court.231 
The Rome Statute states that the ICC has personal jurisdiction over persons who have 
committed serious international crimes232 and a person accused of a crime must be over 
eighteen years of age at time the crime was committed. The court not only has jurisdiction of 
nationals of states parties; the court also has jurisdiction over individuals who are nationals 
of non-party states, provided the non-party state accepts the court‟s jurisdiction, or through 
the UN Security Council which empowers the court to exercise such jurisdiction.233 
In terms of article 4 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has territorial jurisdiction over territory of 
any state party to the statute, and over the territory of any other state party that has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by special agreement.234 Liu argues that the territorial 
jurisdiction of the ICC displays a character of uncertainty as the ICC can only exercise its 
powers on the territories of state parties and non-state parties that have accepted its 
jurisdiction.235 Sovereign states have the power to withdraw or accede from the Rome 
Statute or to determine whether to accept the court‟s jurisdiction.236 This power of the 
sovereign states may lead to reduction or extension of territorial jurisdiction, thus creating 
uncertainty relating to the jurisdiction of the ICC.237  
Furthermore, article 12238 which addresses the court‟s power of extending jurisdiction to a 
third party that is not a signatory, becomes unclear when read with article 124.239 Article 124 
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provides that states parties have the right to reject the court‟s jurisdiction in respect to war 
crimes within seven years of submitting to it, while for non-state parties are not explicitly 
given the right to withdraw. Thus, the provisions of article 124 are deemed to be unfair to 
non-state parties, as it is unclear whether they enjoy the same protection as that given to a 
state party even though they have accepted jurisdiction. Furthermore, the provision has 
been criticised and regarded as a „free pass‟ to commit war crimes by state parties to the 
statute which beats the whole purpose of what the court was formed for.240 In addition, 
article 12 fails to address whether non-state party are entitled to the full protection of the 
statute after accepting jurisdiction.   
A further criticism of the Rome Statute is that the court‟s jurisdiction over non-party state 
nationals contradicts article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties, which 
stipulates that only states that are parties to a treaty are bound by the terms thereof.241 On 
the other hand, territorial jurisdiction is universally accepted and there is no rule under 
international law that prohibits any state from delegating power to the ICC to prosecute those 
responsible for international crimes.242 Critics of the ICC have further argued that where the 
court lacks jurisdiction because the state concerned is not a state party to the statute, 
through the UN Security Council, prosecution maybe instigated for political reason.243 
Moreover, Hans-Peter Kaul244 argues that article 12 is poorly formulated as it requires the 
states parties to fulfil the restrictive preconditions in order for the court to have jurisdiction, 
and acceptance of the statute by the custodial state or the state of nationality of the victim 
does not result in the court having jurisdiction. In addition, he argues that the jurisdiction 
under article 12 is further weakened by the procedural hurdles; for instance where consent 
for jurisdiction is required from non-party state, a declaration has to be made to the registrar 
although the statute does not give details of such declaration.245  
In terms of article 11 of the Rome Statute, temporal jurisdiction is stipulated where the court 
may exercise jurisdiction only of crimes committed after the statute came into force, unless a 
declaration is made to the registrar of the court stating otherwise.246  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or 
exception in accordance with Part 9. 
239
Article 124 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
240
Driscoll et al The International Criminal Court 18. 
241
Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 608. 
242
Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 609. 
243
Driscoll et al The international Criminal Court 16. 
244
Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary 612.  
245
Ibid. 
246
Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
31 
 
In exercising jurisdiction, the ICC requires the cooperation of member states to enforce its 
mandate, demonstrating additional flaws related to the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
regarding the court‟s decisions.247 The location where crimes have been committed adds to 
the court‟s difficulties in exercising jurisdiction248. In some cases mass crimes have been 
committed in geographical remote regions, inhibiting the court‟s access to information and 
giving rise to concern for the safety of court‟s officials.249  
The ICC has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes being genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes as stipulated in articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute and as 
discussed in Chapter one of this treatise.250 The limits to the prosecution of these crimes as 
outlined above have been criticised by a number of scholars, who contend that additional 
international crimes, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, should be included in the court‟s 
jurisdiction.251 Other scholars insist that the limits to the court‟s jurisdiction prevent it from 
functioning effectively and efficiently.252  
The discussions in Rome prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute were focused on creating 
a permanent international criminal court for crimes committed during armed conflicts and to 
do away with ad hoc tribunals. Ad hoc tribunals had failed to deter commission of 
international crimes as intended initially; the ICC hoped to eliminate the growing culture of 
impunity.253 The court‟s objective of bringing war criminals to justice had been frustrated.254 
The ideals and objectives were further emphasized in the preamble to the Rome Statute.255 
To date, a culture of impunity remains at large, despite the existence of a permanent 
international criminal court. 
Article 13 of the Rome Statute addresses the exercise of the court‟s jurisdiction and provides 
that the UN Security Council may refer a situation to the prosecutor, acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations. A state party to the Rome Statute may also refer the 
situation to the prosecutor or state party automatically has jurisdiction.256   
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In the case of self-referral, for instance the self-referrals made by Uganda, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, and Mali, the process has been 
criticised. These self-referrals were seen as having been made with the intention to remove 
political adversaries from government rather than to prosecute grave crimes committed with 
impunity.257 In respect of a situation being referred by the UN Security Council, it is unclear 
whether the crimes referred by this body must be within the four listed in article 5.258  
In terms of article 39 of the UN Charter,259 the Security Council has the power to refer “any 
existence to threat of peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression”260 to the court. 
Therefore, authors question the ability of the UN Security Council to refer any crime that 
threatens peace to the prosecutor as stipulated in the Charter.261 In addition, the UN Security 
Council further has the power to postpone an ICC investigation, if it determines that such 
postponement would be in the in interest of peace in relation to article 39 of the UN 
Charter.262 Various critics warn that this constitutes a veto power over what was supposed to 
be an independent court.263 The author submits that the UN Security Council may not refer 
any crime to the court, but the nature the wording of the article raises questions and creates 
ambiguity, creating the impression that any crime that threatens the existence of peace may 
be referred to the court. In this instance, article 39 of the UN Charter should be read in 
conjunction with articles 5 and 13 of the Rome Statute, as the UN Security Council plays a 
role in the determination of the crime of aggression, which is not defined by the Statute but is 
also referred to under article 39 of the UN Charter. 
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3 5 Scope of Jurisdiction in terms of the Protocol of the SADC Tribunal and the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
There is no mention of jurisdiction for criminal prosecution for genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes in the SADC Tribunal. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction over 
disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the SADC Statutes and Protocol.264 
Although the tribunal can be used by the Southern African states, the provisions regarding 
jurisdiction in terms of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal is not useful in the creation of the 
proposed African criminal court.   
The jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is aimed at human rights 
specifically at human rights matters, with no mention made of criminal matters.265 However, 
Ministers of Justice and Attorney General of the African Union met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
in May 2012 to discuss the possible extension of the court‟s jurisdiction to include genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.266  
The meeting led to the adoption of the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.267 The objectives set out herein 
include adding international criminal jurisdiction to the court‟s scope and making structural 
amendments.268 Currently the Draft Protocol waits for approval from Executive Council, 
Assembly of Heads of states, governments and is before the Assembly of the African Union 
for formal adoption and signature.269 To date, the process been a slow one.270  
3 6 Conclusion  
Limitation on temporal and territorial jurisdiction plays a significant part in the statutes of the 
above courts discussed, creating difficulties in areas relating to jurisdiction. These limitations 
should be taken into account with respect to the proposed African criminal court. If Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is included with respect to the proposed African court, 
provisions relating to violations made in an international armed conflict should be clearly 
stated. The inability and unwillingness provided for in article 17 of the Rome Statute is 
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ambiguous as there is no applicable standard to confirm either condition.271 Despite the 
principle of complementarity, the ICC is still empowered to act a superior court thus making 
the whole principle inapplicable. Article 124 can also be seen as defeating the purpose of 
what the ICC was formed for because it allows states parties to withdraw from war crime 
jurisdiction. In exercising jurisdiction, the ICC requires the cooperation of member states to 
enforce its mandate, demonstrating additional flaws related to the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms regarding the court‟s decisions.272 Cooperation is not always available for 
example in the ICC indictment issued against al-Bashir the AU urged its members not to 
cooperate with the court with regard to the indictment and to date; the court has not received 
any support.  
The UN Security Council is empowered to refer the situation to the prosecutor, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN. The position is unclear to whether the crimes referred by this body 
must be within the four listed in article 5. In terms of article 39 of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council has the power to refer “any existence to threat of peace, breach of peace, 
or act of aggression”273 to the court. Therefore, authors question the ability of the UN 
Security Council to refer any crime that threatens peace to the prosecutor as stipulated in 
the Charter.274 The author submits that the UN Security Council may not refer any crime to 
the court, but the nature the wording of the article raises questions and creates ambiguity, 
creating the impression that any crime that threatens the existence of peace may be referred 
to the court. In this instance, article 39 of the UN Charter should be read in conjunction with 
articles 5 and 13 of the Rome Statute, as the UN Security Council plays a role in the 
determination of the crime of aggression, which is not defined by the Statute but is also 
referred to under article 39 of the UN Charter. 
In considering the challenges on jurisdiction faced by the ad-hoc tribunals and ICC, a 
proposed African criminal court may be necessary, created while taking into account 
solutions of such challenges. The next chapter looks at the concept of immunity and 
amnesty as reflected in the Statutes of ad-hoc tribunals and the ICC. A critical discussion will 
be given with respect to the provisions relating to amnesty and immunity provided for by the 
Statutes, other relevant international law and related case law.  
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Chapter Four  
The Concept of Immunity and Amnesty as reflected in the Statutes of Ad-hoc 
Tribunals and the International Criminal Court. 
4 1 Introduction  
There is no consistent definition of immunity of state official under international law. The 
word immunity originated from the late Middle-English, and in Latin it means to be exempted 
from liability and public service or charge.275 In general, immunity of state officials means 
exception, resistance, exemption, protection or invulnerability and also an exemption from a 
duty, liability or service of process; especially where such exemption is granted to a public 
official.276 Immunity from prosecution is thus a withdrawal from prosecution, which may 
constitute a defence under international law and may be exercised at any time during trial 
but before judgement is given.277 Immunity is also a ground that excludes liability of an 
individual and can be personal or functional immunity in nature.278 Amnesty is defined as an 
act of a sovereign state granting immunity from criminal prosecutions to a person or a group 
for past criminal acts.279 There is a “crystallising international norm” against impunity which 
denies the legal possibility for amnesty for serious international crimes.280 
Apart from limiting the applicability of traditional immunities to state officials liable of 
international crimes, international law is also eroding amnesties, a further instrument used in 
protecting criminals.281 This chapter will focus on issues pertaining to the validity and 
applicability of immunity and amnesty granted to a perpetrator who has committed serious 
international crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in cases where international courts and tribunals 
are faced with duty to prosecute. 
A critical discussion will be given with respect to the provisions relating to amnesty and 
immunity provided for by the Statute of SCSL, Rome Statute of the ICC, Statute of the ICTR, 
any other relevant international law and related case law dealing with immunity and 
amnesty. The Statute of SCSL282 addresses amnesty in articles 10 whereas Rome Statute of 
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the ICC283 addresses immunity in articles 27 and 98. The Statute of the ICTR284 focuses on 
immunity in article 29. The Statute of SCSL does not specifically provide provisions relating 
to immunity and the same applies to the Rome Statute and Statute of the ICTR in relation to 
amnesty. 
Chapter four of this treatise focuses on immunity from prosecution granted to an individual 
accused, such as a state official in relation to international crimes before the international 
court and tribunals. The granting of immunity and the type of immunity issued depends on 
whether one is dealing with foreign diplomats, head of states or other high ranking 
officials.285 A discussion of immunity and amnesty under international law is followed by an 
examination of these two concepts in relation to the relevant statutes. The concept of 
immunity and amnesty is important to the overall theme because this area of law is one the 
challenges faced by the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. These two concepts shall be looked at 
in relation to creation of an African criminal court.  
4 2 Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law 
Duty to prosecute international crimes under international law is one area of international law 
that has remained controversial.286 The sources of duty to prosecute international crimes fail 
to expressly oblige states to prosecute and punish.287 Furthermore, it was argued that state 
practice under this area of law is inconsistent.288 International crimes are not unanimously 
defined under international law.289 The ILC„s Draft Articles on State Responsibility defines 
international crimes as crimes of the state.290 Most of these crimes are usually committed by 
men rather than the state. In addressing international crimes, the treatise focuses on 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Duty to prosecute is derived from international conventions to which a state is party to or 
alternatively, an existing customary norm of international law which may create an obligation 
to prosecute certain crimes, even where a state did not explicitly agree.291 Therefore, failure 
to prosecute may amount to breach of the state‟s obligation under the convention.292 The 
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Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols which are part of customary international 
law, enforce a duty to prosecute. The Geneva Conventions oblige a state to prosecute or 
extradite those guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.293 Grave breaches 
include “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to 
serve in the forces of a hostile power and depriving prisoner of war and protected persons 
rights to a fair and regular trial, and taking of hostages”.294  
Once a crime is identified having jus cogens status, it imposes obligation erga omnes which 
also include the duty to prosecute those accountable.295 Jus cogens is a fundamental 
principle of international law which is accepted by the international community as a rule from 
which no derogation by any state is permitted.296 Under international law, it is generally 
accepted that crimes against humanity, and war crimes form part of jus cogens norm.297 
Erga omnes is an obligation which is legally enforceable and non-derogable and must be 
recognised and accepted under international law.298 Duty to prosecute may also exist under 
universal jurisdiction.299 
The Convention on Non-applicability of Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity further provides a duty to prosecute and requires the state not to apply 
statutory limitation.300 The 1996 International Law Commission‟s Draft Code of Crimes 
against Peace and Security of Mankind which includes prosecution of crimes against 
humanity further supports the duty of states to prosecute offenders.301  
In addition, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
which forms part of customary international law, places a duty to prosecute by requiring the 
punishment of genocide by states parties. This is evident in article 1 of the Convention which 
states that: 
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“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time 
of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish”.
302
  
Moreover, the Rome Statute places an obligation on state parties to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes within the court‟s jurisdiction as evident in article 5 of the 
statute.303 A state party risks an intervention the ICC if they fail to conduct such investigation 
or prosecution. 
4 3 Immunity under International Law 
Immunity for state officials first originated from international customary law which recognised 
certain degree of immunity from prosecution for heads of states and other state officials.304 
This type of immunity has evolved in recent years to allow for the prosecution and 
punishment of state officials before an international court or tribunal for international crimes 
under contemporary international law.305   
The concept of immunity is governed by international law and in treaties and statutes of 
international courts and tribunals.306 The application of international criminal law to the 
prosecution of state officials was first observed after the World War II when state officials 
from Germany were prosecuted and punished during the Nuremberg Trials.307 
There are two categories of immunity in international law, namely personal immunity or 
ratione personae, and functional immunity or ratione materiae.308 Personal immunity is 
attached to senior state official while they are in office, and arises with regards to an 
international tribunal or courts where a state official is subject to the jurisdiction of that 
tribunal or court.309 Personal immunity further provides protection from prosecution 
                                                             
302
Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December, 1948. 
303Article 5 of Rome Statute of the ICC. 
304
Slye, R “Immunities and Amnesties” no date http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/AGCHAP7.PDF (accessed 2012-9-
9) [186].  
305
Chacha et al Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa 38. 
306
Markovich, S “Balancing State Sovereignty and Human Rights: Are there Exceptions in International Law to 
Immunity Rules for State Officials?” no date 
http://www.kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/111048/.../Chap4.pdf (accessed 2012-8-17) [59]. 
307
S Markovich “Balancing state sovereignty and human rights: are there exceptions in international law to 
immunity rules for state officials?” http://www.kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/111048/.../Chap4.pdf 
(Accessed on 17 August 2012) [58].    
308
Benzing, M “U.S Non-surrender Agreements and Article 98 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
an Exercise in the Law of Treaties” no date http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/benzing_8.pdf 
(accessed on 2012-8-17) [201]. 
309
Ibid. 
39 
 
regardless of nature of the act.310 Functional immunity protects the person from liability for 
official acts performed on behalf of the state.311 
As previously mentioned, the granting of immunity to a head of state of foreign diplomat 
depends on the category of immunity under discussion.312 With respect to the foreign 
diplomats, article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,313 grants diplomatic 
immunity from criminal prosecution and article 32 further provides that personal immunity 
may be waived by the sending state provided it does so expressedly. Contemporary 
international law defines state officials as state leaders or representatives.314 State and other 
high ranking officials enjoy functional immunity with respect to acts performed in their official 
capacity; this immunity does not cease once they leave office.315 In addition, high ranking 
officials enjoy personal immunity while acting in their official capacity.316 
In establishing the kind of immunity that applies to a state official, a distinction must be made 
between proceedings before national courts and those before international courts.317 At 
national courts, state officials enjoy both types of immunity but at international level; the 
defence for immunity is less.318 It is clear that a state official cannot be held criminally liable 
for their official acts, but it is also clear that genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes have become unofficial for purposes of immunity.319  
In terms of international law, all states are obliged to prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
international crimes. Obligation has attained the status of customary international law and is 
a jus cogens norm in which no derogation is permitted.320 Where such a crime has been 
committed, a state may refer the case to the ICC or prosecute the accused under national 
law.321 When punishment of individuals responsible for international crimes is weighed 
against the immunity of state officials, the duty to prosecute and punish prevails.322 In 
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addition, it should be noted that other writers have argued that the jus cogen nature of 
international crimes provides for the automatic removal for immunity.323   
4 3 1 Immunity in terms of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Special Court of Sierra Leone and Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 
Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are committed not by the state but by 
individuals, such as state officials.324 State officials do not necessarily personally or directly 
commit these crimes, but held accountable for acting as co-perpetrators or tolerating, 
inciting, aiding or condoning these acts.325 Generally, international courts and tribunals have 
held that state officials do not benefit from immunity accorded to them by national or 
international law, especially where such officials have been charged with international 
crimes.326 This was demonstrated in the ICTR, ICC and SCSL.327 
 
4 3 1 1 The Statute of the ICTR 
The concept of immunity is reflected under article 29 of the Statute of the ICTR.328 Article 29 
paragraph 4 addresses immunity granted to other persons, which includes the accused 
when required to be present at the ICTR, provided it is in the interest of the tribunal.329 In 
addition, article 29 (3) and (4) reflects theory of functional immunity and addresses acts 
performed as part of individual‟s official functions but not those acts performed in private.  
The article further grants immunity to judges, prosecutors and their staff in terms of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunity of the United Nations.330 The Statute of the ICTR 
does not specifically prohibit immunity, but article 6 (2) provides that the official position of a 
person shall not relieve that individual from prosecution.331 Thus, it is safe to assume that 
that person may have official immunity attached to the relevant official position.332  
Furthermore, in most of the ICTR cases, the court held that the official position of an 
individual is not a defence for prosecution or a mitigating factor.333 Despite failure by the 
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statute to expressly reject immunity of state officials, Rwandan government enacted a 
separate legislation outlawing immunity of such persons who have committed genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.334  
4 3 1 2 The Rome Statute of the ICC 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute also addresses the irrelevance of official capacity and any 
immunity attached to it, and states that the official capacity of a member of government, 
parliament, and head of state shall not bar that person from criminal prosecution.335 This was 
demonstrated in the ICC indictment against president Omar al-Bashir. This indictment was in 
contrast to the International Court of Justice‟s ruling which held that a serving state official 
enjoys immunity from prosecution under customary international law and disregarded 
customary international law duty of states to prosecute.336  Article 98 requires cooperation 
from states with respect to waiver of immunity, and prevents the court from proceeding with 
a request for surrender or assistance that would require the requested state to act 
inconsistently with its obligation under international law in relation to immunity of a given 
person.337  
The restriction placed upon article 98(1) interferes with the jurisdiction of the ICC and limits 
the court‟s ability to try suspects for serious international crimes, especially if a trial under 
international law would be the most appropriate option.338 Moreover, there is uncertainty in 
cases where the receiving state of the suspect is a non-party to the Rome Statute; such 
suspect may never be brought before the ICC in the absence of a UN Security Council 
referral.339 Although such suspect may face justice under state of nationality if deported, 
such uncertainty remains.340   
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Article 27 of the Rome Statute must be read together with article 98 of the statute.341 The 
rule under international customary law stating that sovereign immunity does not apply to 
prosecution renders article 98(1) redundant and indicates that article 98(1) was not properly 
coordinated with article 27.342 The provisions of article 27 and 98(1) appear to be conflict 
with each other. Article 27 makes it clear that personal and functional immunity do not apply 
against a sitting head of state, but article 98 provides that a state is not forced to surrender 
an individual to the court if doing so would be inconsistent with diplomatic immunity.343 
4 3 1 3 The Statute of the SCSL 
Similar to the Statute of the ICTR, article 6 (2) of the Statute of SCSL outlaws the use of 
official position as a defence against criminal prosecution for international crimes.344 
Although the statute does not state this, it could mean that it outlaws any form of immunity 
offered to a state official through article 6(2). The appeals chamber of SCSL demonstrated 
this in the case against Charles Taylor, confirming that the official position of a person, 
whether a state official or not does not bar prosecution before international courts.345 Taylor 
had official immunity from a state that was not party to the initial agreement establishing a 
SCSL, and was subject to criminal prosecution before the SCSL.346  
The Appeal chamber of the SCSL never the less rejected the immunity defence raised by 
Taylor and held that: 
“We hold that the official position of the Applicant as an incumbent Head of State at the time 
when these criminal proceedings were initiated against him is not a bar to his prosecution by 
this court. The Applicant was and is subject to criminal proceedings before the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone”.
347
 
 
At present, there is no regional instrument outlawing the immunity of state officials in Africa. 
Consequently, it becomes problematic for the prosecutor to hold the perpetrator 
accountable. However, based on customary and international law, it may be argued that 
such state officials should not benefit from immunity for international crimes. In Africa, the 
only express sub-regional treaty that calls for prosecution of individuals who commit 
                                                             
341
Markovich, S “Balancing State Sovereignty and Human Rights: are there Exceptions in International Law to 
Immunity Rules for State Officials?” no date 
http://www.kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/111048/.../Chap4.pdf (accessed 2012-8-17) [61]. 
342
Van der Vyver, J D “Prosecuting President Omar Al Bashir in the International Criminal Court” no date 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/PDF%20Files/Johan%20van%20der%20Vyver.pdf (accessed 2012-8-
17) [8]. 
343
Article 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
344
Article 6 of the Statute of SCSL. 
345
Summary of Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor case number SCSL-2003-01-I http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=%2FD7FMJxcHd0%3D&tabid=191 (accessed 2012-9-3).  
346
Ibid. 
347
Ibid. 
43 
 
international crimes and rejects immunity of state officials is the Protocol for the Prevention 
and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
and all forms of Discrimination.348  
Most of the treaty provisions do not specifically remove the immunities granted to officials, 
although it appears that international law intends to hold officials liable for serious crimes.349 
According to the 2008 International Law Commission Preliminary Report on Immunity of the 
state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, treaty law (for example statutes of the ICTR, 
SCSL) does not give a precise definition of those enjoying immunity, and there is no 
universal international treaty regulating issues relating to immunity of current and former 
officials.350 The report further concludes that not all treaties dealing with immunity of state 
official have come into force, and those that have, are not internationally recognised.351   
 
4 4 Amnesty in terms of International Law 
At international law, amnesty granted to any perpetrators liable for international crimes such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, cannot be upheld and does not bind 
international or regional courts or tribunals.352 These crimes form part of jus cogens norms in 
international law.353 The argument that any amnesty given for jus cogens crimes is 
inconsistent with the obligation of the state to provide accountability for those crimes that 
infringe international law, was demonstrated in  a number of cases, including the Kallon and 
the Furundzija case.354 The United Nations Human Rights Committee supports the decision 
above.355 
Under international law, in terms of the principle of universal jurisdiction, it is the legal 
obligation of the state to bring those who bear responsibility for international crimes, 
irrespective of their nature of occurrence, to justice and amnesty conflicts with this 
obligation.356 Similarly, international law reflects the growing realisation of the unacceptability 
of granting amnesties for gross violations of international humanitarian law that are so 
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serious in nature that there is no justification for such actions.357 In light to this, it is argued 
that there is a duty on a state to prosecute those suspected of international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.358  
For an amnesty to be legitimate under international law, it must not contravene a state‟s 
obligation under any international treaty to which it is a party.359 Article 4 of the Genocide 
Convention stipulates that persons who commit genocide “shall be punished,” whether they 
are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.360 Article 5 
requires contracting parties to act affirmatively by enacting legislation providing effective 
penalties for persons guilty of genocide.361 Treaty obligations under the Genocide 
Convention, being jus cogens, cannot be excused362 and the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of the Treaties states in article 26 that a state party “may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.363  
However, in terms of the doctrine of national sovereignty, states are free to pass amnesty 
laws as they please. Despite the action being legal, a state may nonetheless limit its 
sovereignty by ratifying an international treaty which has non-derogable obligations.364 The 
Charter and the judgments of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg confirmed the 
primacy of international law over national law, especially for crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.365 Arguably, states therefore have a choice to grant 
amnesty for international law, except in the case of genocide and grave breaches of Geneva 
Conventions where statutes oblige states to prosecute or the accused to be extradited.366  
4 4 1 Amnesty in terms of the Statutes of SCSL, ICTR, and Rome Statute of the 
ICC 
4 4 1 1 The Statute of SCSL 
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The Statute of SCSL is the only statute that specifically outlaws amnesty of the accused, 
unlike the Statute of the ICTR and Rome Statute. Article 10 of the Statute of the SCSL 
prohibits any amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the court and 
shall not be barred from prosecution.367 It is argued that, considering the situation in Sierra 
Leone, an amnesty deal may in fact assist in the creation of a culture of impunity instead of 
creating peace.368 The United Nations Secretary General stated in his 2000 report on the 
establishment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone that: 
“„While recognising that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of peace and 
reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an internal armed conflict, […] amnesty cannot be 
granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.‟”
369
 
The SCSL held in the Gbao case that, under international law, states have a duty to 
prosecute crimes where prohibition has attained the status of jus cogens and the grant of 
amnesty or pardon for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes would be a breach 
of a state‟s obligations under international law.370 
In the Kallon case, the SCSL considered the appeals of two defendants who argued that the 
amnesty granted under the Lomé Agreement precluded their trial before the SCSL.371 The 
Lomé Agreement was a ceasefire agreement between the Sierra Leonean government and 
the Revolutionary United Front which granted amnesty to all participants in the armed 
conflict.372 A disclaimer was added to the agreement that amnesty provisions would not 
apply in the case of crimes against humanity and war crimes.373  
The accused, Kallon and Kamara, argued that not all amnesties are unlawful under 
international law as well as that the Lomé Peace Agreement was binding on the government 
of Sierra Leone, as it constituted an international treaty governed by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.374 They argued that the government of Sierra Leone was in breach of 
its international obligation as it was its duty to ensure that no legal action would be taken 
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against the members of RUF and other parties to the armed conflict.375 The accused further 
claimed that article 10 of the Statute of SCSL prohibiting amnesty was unlawful as it 
interfered with the Lomé Peace Agreement, but the SCSL held that the parties failed to 
prove the unlawfulness of the article.376 
In the Appeal Chamber, the SCSL refuted the argument in favour of amnesty and held that 
the Lomé Peace Agreement did not constitute an international instrument.377 The SCSL 
further held that the granting of amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes is a breach by a state of its obligation towards an international community as a whole 
and international courts may not be denied jurisdiction.378 
4 4 1 2 The Statute of ICTR 
Statute of the ICTR does not specifically prohibit amnesty, nor does it encourage it. 
However, the statute does contemplate the trial of all persons responsible for violation of 
serious international humanitarian law and obliges cooperation from states in the 
investigation and prosecution of such persons.379 This could indicate that amnesty in not 
permitted but on the other hand failure to address it could also imply possible support. 
4 4 1 3 The Rome Statute of the ICC 
The Rome Statute does not recognise amnesty nor does it specifically prohibit it. Dugard380 
argues that omission of amnesty was deliberate based on the wording of the preamble which 
affirms “serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished” and expresses determination “to put an end to impunity for perpetrators of 
those crimes.” However, there is sufficient evidence that amnesty may be recognised in 
certain circumstances. It has been argued that article 16 recognises amnesty where the UN 
Security Council, acting under this article, may order a deferral of a prosecution for twelve 
months where amnesty has been granted.381 Such amnesty must be within the ambit of 
Chapter VII of Charter of the United Nations.382 Other Articles contemplating recognition of 
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amnesty include articles 17(1) (b) and 20.383 In Article 17(1) (b) is where a state having 
jurisdiction investigates a case and decides not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision not to pursue the matter is as a result of inability or unwillingness of the state to 
genuinely carry out that prosecution.384  
It can be argued that article 20 supports amnesty. It addresses the principle of ne bis in idem 
which means no person shall be tried before the court with respect to the crimes for which 
the person has been convicted or acquitted.385 In this instance, it was argued that defence 
for amnesty would have been made under this provision.386 However, the article requires the 
person to have been tried by a court other than the ICC.387 As a result, the accused cannot 
rely on the defence of amnesty as it was left out deliberately.388 
Moreover, amnesty may also be protected by prosecutorial discretion in terms of article 
53(2) (c) of the Rome Statute. This article allows the prosecutor to refuse prosecution at the 
request of a state or UN Security Council where, after investigation and consideration all 
circumstances, the prosecutor concludes that a prosecution is not in the interest of justice.389 
The prosecutor may also decline to exercise discretion to prosecute under Article 15 based 
on the ground that the accused has been granted amnesty.390 
4 4 1 4 Arguments in Favour of Amnesty 
A general duty to prosecute under international law is not supported by state practice.391 
Some countries such as South Africa and Uganda, have granted amnesty to officials of 
previous regimes who were guilty of international crimes such as crimes against humanity 
instead of prosecuting them.392 
Uganda‟s Amnesty Act, enacted in 2000, and was intended as an instrument to end the 
armed conflict in the country by encouraging rebels to lay down their arms without the fear of 
prosecution for crimes committed during the armed conflict, through the offer of amnesty.393 
This offer of amnesty played a vital role in motivating fighters to escape or defect from the 
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Lord‟s Resistance Army.394 The amnesty and peace process were complicated by the ICC 
indictments and the court‟s uncertainty about the prosecution of those that had been granted 
such amnesty.395 The Ugandan referral to the ICC was done after the decision was made to 
grant amnesty.396 Thus it is reasonable to assume that, at the time of the referral, the 
Ugandan government did not view prosecution by the ICC as incompatible with the 
amnesty.397 
While some commentators argue that no amnesty should be taken into account by the ICC, 
a number of them formulated criteria to determine whether amnesty should be taken into 
account.398 These are:  
i. “That the amnesty be granted through some form of process, and thus not a blanket amnesty, 
ii. That the amnesty be available to all parties to a conflict, and thus not designed to benefit only 
one party, 
iii. That the amnesty be the product of a democratic process, and thus not a self amnesty, 
iv. That the amnesty provides some form of accountability.”
399
 
With respect to the armed conflict in Uganda, the individuals involved in the conflict tend to 
be both perpetrators and victims.400 In this situation, children were forced to consume drugs 
and to participate in the violation of international humanitarian law, international criminal law 
and international human rights law.401 Where an amnesty is granted to such perpetrator(s), 
the ICC may be inclined to refuse an amnesty granted to a child soldier than it may be to 
decline amnesty granted to an adult soldier.402 In the past, no leader of the LRA had sought, 
nor been granted amnesty, and nothing in the Ugandan legislation prevented the grant of 
amnesty.403 However, recently the government of Uganda abolished the amnesty legislation 
making it impossible for any attempts for application for amnesty.404 
A portion of the Uganda population felt that, if the ICC proceeded with its indictments, it 
would unlawfully interfere with the reasonable expectations of those individuals who were 
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granted amnesty and, as a result, the peace process.405 The abolishment of amnesty 
legislation may reduce the number of defectors from the LRA; current LRA members may 
fear escaping as they could face prosecution.406  
The majority of civil society, local communities, victims, and former LRA combatants in 
northern Uganda want amnesty to continue and to be granted to LRA rebels.407The Gulu-
based Justice and Reconciliation Project found in their 2011 research that 98% of 
respondents across northern Uganda were against the abolishment of amnesty 
legislation.408 Another research project conducted this organisation in March 2012 found 
support among northerners for the renewal of the Amnesty Act.409  
Amnesty has also been used as form of political reconciliation and advancement 
reconciliation in societies in order to achieve peace and order.410 As much as the 
international law favours prosecution, a new institution has appeared that challenges the 
need for prosecution.411 Since 1974, seventeen Truth and Reconciliation Commissions412 
have been established that have the power to issue amnesty.413 
Certain authors argue that prosecution has decreased after establishment of TRCs, even 
where the identity of the perpetrators are known.414 TRCs and prosecution appear to be 
competing mechanisms in practice when dealing with crimes where prosecution emphasises 
the right to justice and society„s demand for retribution.415 A TRC intends to ensure the right 
to know and understand the past rather than retribution.416 Various authors contend that 
international critics, mostly strangers to repression, fail to understand societies‟ 
circumstances where amnesty is preferred over prosecution.417 Societies‟ circumstances 
such as the nature of the armed conflict should be taken into account when deciding whether 
to prosecutor or to grant amnesty. 
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The nature of the armed conflict was one the factors taken into account by South Africa in 
deciding whether to grant amnesty or to prosecute those responsible for human rights 
abuses during the apartheid. For transition to democracy to take place peacefully in 1994, 
amnesty seemed to be the only solution.418 This was demonstrated by the generals in 
command of the South African police who threatened withdrawal of support and safeguard of 
the electoral process if government elected intended to prosecute members of the police 
force.419 For the African National Congress government, failure to grant amnesty would have 
interfered with the ongoing negotiations and mass mobilisation and political confrontation 
would have returned. It is evident above that amnesty was being used as a tool for peace.420  
Authors such as Paul Van Zyl421 hold that the amnesty agreement influenced and shaped 
South Africa‟s transition to democracy. Van Zyl422 insists that prosecution would have been 
difficult because evidence had been destroyed, and office of the prosecutor lacked 
prosecutorial resources to complete its cases. For example, the government at that time 
could not afford to finance thousand political trials in order to prosecute those responsible 
and trial preparation and proceeding of that nature were time consuming and it would have 
taken hundreds of years of pre-trial preparation to complete the cases.423 The nature of 
South African transition, combined with the inability of the criminal justice system to hold 
those accountable, allowed the creation of TRC.424 
As much as South Africa failed to comply the international obligation to punish the 
perpetrators under international law, Van Zyl425 further argues that international prosecution 
faces challenges in a number of areas for  example, it tend to focus on the powerful leaders 
responsible but it is often  difficult to obtain jurisdiction of such leaders. In addition, due to 
constraint on resources, prosecution of a small percentage of perpetrators can only take 
place of the total number of perpetrators involved.426  
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South Africa and other states may rely on the view that international law encourages 
amnesty rather than opposing it.427 This is evident in article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II 
which stipulates that:  
“At the end hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible 
amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their 
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained”.
428
    
Apart from supporting South African amnesty in 1994, the UN has also implicitly approved 
several amnesty deals in Africa.429 The UN did not help negotiate the terms of amnesty deal 
nor did it encourage parties to agree to enter into an agreement, and neither did it take any 
action to de facto legitimize the amnesty.430 This is evident with respect to the Rome 
Agreement of Sierra Leone which contained an amnesty clause and the UN did not object to 
this.431 Before the indictment against Charles Taylor, UN envoy assisted in the negotiations 
of Taylor‟s exile to Nigeria.432 Despite the calls for accountability, the UN does not 
disapprove the use of amnesty and appears to favour accountability over peace only when 
political costs are low.433 Although international scholars and various courts agree that 
domestic amnesties do not bar prosecution for international crimes, in reality, there have 
been few attempts to prosecute persons protected with such amnesties.434     
4 4 1 5 Arguments in Favour of Prosecution 
International scholars in favour of prosecution argue that prosecution is necessary to:  
i. “Deter violations of human rights;  
ii. Restore the rule of law; and 
iii. Honour the victim‟s right to seek justice”.
435
  
International legal scholars argue that amnesties may send signals to regimes that they have 
nothing to lose by committing crimes to further their own agendas therefore may create a 
notion of impunity.436 In addition, prosecution is necessary to deter the commission of future 
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crimes, not just in the state where they occurred but throughout the entire international 
community.437 
Furthermore, these scholars insist that every person has the right to certain fundamental 
rights which include the rights to justice, judicial protection and reasonable remedy and 
criminals trials form part of these rights and are necessary to honour such fundamental 
rights.438  
International scholars in favour of this notion argue that punishing perpetrators is a form of 
giving retribution for victims of war crimes and failing to provide justice may encourage 
commission of future international crimes.439 Prosecution of those accountable sends a 
message to leaders in power that ethnic violence as too for power outweighs its benefits.440 
Various authors have argued that apart from prosecuting, the institutions must ensure and 
prevent further human rights abuses from re-occurring in future.441 This has been 
demonstrated by the ICTR which has contributed to peace building and criminal 
accountability by marginalising nationalist political leaders and other forces allied to 
genocide and transformed the criminal justice to an important institution under international 
law.442 
4 5 Conclusion  
It is clear that immunity and amnesty have lost their traditional recognition they previously 
had. Under contemporary international law, official persons may be prosecuted before an 
international court or tribunal despite the defence of immunity. Arguments have been raised 
that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are no longer permissible grounds 
for immunity.  
With regard to the Statute of the ICTR, despite having provisions that may be linked to 
prohibition of immunity for state officials, there is no specific prohibition with regard to 
immunity. The Statute of SCSL does not explicitly provide provisions against immunity but 
case law shows that the court is against it. Despite the Rome Statute consisting of specific 
articles outlawing the defence of immunity from criminal proceedings, the provisions appear 
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to be conflicting. In addition there is no regional or universal international treaty regulating 
issues of immunity.443 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Constitutive Act of the African Union fails to 
expressly reject the use of immunity as a defence.444 Few African states have outlawed the 
immunity of state officials as a defence from prosecution.445 These countries include South 
Africa, Uganda, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Kenya, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and 
Ethiopia.446 
Under international law, amnesty granted to any perpetrators liable for international crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes cannot be upheld and does not 
bind international or regional courts or tribunals. However, states can grant amnesty.447 The 
Statute of SCSL is the only statute that specifically prohibits amnesty granted to any person 
and the Statute of the ICTR does not specifically bar the use of amnesty defence. 
TRCs are important institution in the peacemaking processes, but where crimes not only 
offend national law but also international law, international community has an interest in the 
proceedings and favours prosecution as opposed to the establishment of TRC.448 Moreover, 
it is possible that a trial under the ICC may arise involving a former dictator granted amnesty 
and may require the prosecutor of the ICC to consider amnesty in the exercise of discretion, 
since amnesty is not specifically prohibited nor upheld in the Rome Statute.  
In the case of Uganda, the granting of amnesty became problematic once the ICC stepped 
in, as the court had to decide whether to consider amnesty granted to all parties that took 
part in the armed conflict for the sake of peace or to prosecute. This type of situation creates 
the dilemma of peace competing with justice, especially where society as a whole favours 
peace. This area needs to be developed especially where a court is faced with such 
dilemma. 
In determining whether to recognise amnesty, various international scholars contend that 
one must consider whether the amnesty strikes the appropriate balance between justice and 
peace.449 It requires trading one good (justice) in exchange of another (peace).450This means 
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that the amnesty granted should end hostilities and avoid placing the cost of justice on the 
conflict-ridden state and on the other hand, it should hold criminals accountable for their 
actions by ensuring that they do not repeat the commission of similar crimes in future.451  
In light of the above, the proposed African criminal court would have to consider the 
challenges faced by the above statutes and attempt to remedy them in order to avoid such 
problems recurring. In an attempt to establish an African criminal court with jurisdiction over 
international crimes, the Draft Protocol452 provides a separate section that prohibits immunity 
from prosecution granted under international law, but fails to address the position of former 
state leaders who have been granted immunity from prosecution. In addition, it fails to 
address the issue of amnesty. The proposed African criminal court should provide provisions 
dealing with amnesty and immunity. 
The next chapter discusses the possible legal implications on domestic, regional, and 
international level of the Draft Protocol on the Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, giving the African Court Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes. This was an attempt made to create an African criminal court. 
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Chapter Five 
Possible Legal Implications of the Draft Protocol on the Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights to give 
the African Court Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
5 1 Introduction 
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights was established as a result of a merger 
between African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights and African Court of Justice which 
came into force in 2008.453 The court consists of two sections; a general affairs and a human 
rights section.454 In February 2010, the AU Commission appointed consultants to process 
the drafting of an amended protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights to add international criminal jurisdiction to the court.455 The court would 
therefore, have a criminal section as the third section, with three chambers; pre-trial 
chamber, trial chamber, and appellate chamber.456 The appellate chamber exists only within 
the international criminal section.457 In June 2010, the consultants completed a first draft of 
the protocol, four months after receiving their mandate.458  
The draft protocol went through various assessments from 2011 to 15 May 2012 of 
government experts, Misters of Justice, Attorney Generals and others, convened by the AU 
Commission.459 Apart from addressing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
the protocol deals with other crimes for example, unconstitutional change of government, 
piracy, terrorism, corruption, trafficking in persons, drugs, and hazardous wastes, 
mercenarism, money laundering, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and crime of 
aggression.460 Despite a large list of crimes, the AU Assembly has the power to increase the 
list within the court‟s jurisdiction to reflect the needs of the continent and developments in 
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international criminal justice.461 Furthermore, the time frame which the AU issued for drafting, 
reviewing and amending was relatively short.462The issues relating to jurisdiction, definition 
of the crime, immunities, resources among others require a more careful examination as it 
appeared the process was rushed without sufficient consultation from other relevant 
bodies.463  
This chapter therefore, discusses the legal implications arising from the draft protocol on 
international, regional, and domestic level, taking into account the failure by the draft 
protocol in defining the relationship between the court and the ICC in relation to jurisdiction 
and African states parties to Rome Statute and the ICC.  
5 2 Legal Implications of the Draft Protocol 
The scope of African Court of Justice and Human Rights jurisdictional reach after the 
proposed extension of criminal jurisdiction is considered too wide. Du Plessis concurs with 
this view and feels that the court would have difficulty in managing the demands created by 
the supplementary jurisdiction in addition to the court‟s current jurisdiction.464 As a result, the 
court‟s ability to fulfil its legal obligation may be called into question.465 The Draft Protocol 
deals with not only the crimes defined in the Rome Statute, but  includes the crime of 
unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit 
exploitation of natural resources, the crime of aggression, and inchoate offences.466 The 
court is expected to prosecute all of these crimes.467  
The ability of the court to extend its jurisdiction to the crimes listed above is called into 
question in comparison to the ICC, which has jurisdiction over four crimes, taking ten years 
to deliver a verdict in the Lubanga468case. This demonstrates the lengthy process involved in 
an international case and calls into question the court‟s ability to protect the accused‟s right 
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to a fair and speedy trial.469 Du Plessis470 holds that the judicial process may be 
compromised when the court is expected to overextend itself with respect to the crimes 
mentioned. 
It should also be noted that for an act or an omission to constitute an international crime, the 
breach has to be universally accepted.471 The Draft Protocol attempts to create jurisdiction of 
a number of crimes that are not yet regarded as international crimes, or fixed in the 
international criminal law firmament, for instance unconstitutional change of government.472  
The drafters of the Rome Statute, when defining the crimes in the court‟s jurisdiction, 
intended the definitions of these crimes to reflect international customary law. However, with 
respect to the Draft Protocol, the legal basis of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights‟ intention to expand its jurisdiction is unclear.473 Moreover, the purpose of the merging 
of the African Court of Justice and African Court of Human and People‟s Rights to create 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights was to reduce costs and the resources 
required.474 The additional criminal jurisdiction adds to expenses and greater investment in 
resources is required to support the three proposed sections (general, human rights, 
criminal).475 In addition, the different legislative branches under criminal law should be taken 
into account and the court will not only need a team of dedicated prosecutors and 
investigators but the court will require highly experienced judges.476 At the ICC, there are a 
number of divisions and supporting staff units responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
three of the fifteen crimes of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.477 Assuming 
that there will be enough manpower to perform similar tasks, a key question is whether there 
will be judicial capacity to address the range of issues involving such crimes.478   
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Vesting the court with criminal jurisdiction raises further important questions about the 
effectiveness, independence, and impartiality of the court in light of financial and budget 
constraints.479 The ICC‟s 2012 budget for investigating three crimes is more than fourteen 
times of that of the African Court of Justice and human Rights‟ budget without the proposed 
criminal component.480 This demonstrates the increase in costs associated with the African 
Court‟s jurisdiction over fifteen crimes. 
Frans Viljoen481 argues that there are sufficient reasons why the two areas of law (that is 
criminal and human rights law) are separate and not merged into a single judicial entity or 
organ at international level. He holds that there are significant differences between courts 
dealing with individual criminal responsibility and those dealing with state responsibility, for 
instance in the area of judicial findings and evidentiary procedures.482  
These differences between the two areas of law are further evident in the nature of the 
courts. Courts dealing with human rights law focus on state responsibility on a standard of 
probability, while criminal courts are focused on individual criminal responsibility beyond 
reasonable doubt. The requirement of „beyond reasonable doubt‟ indicates the seriousness 
of a criminal trial in comparison to a human rights trial. Prosecuting individuals require 
criminal investigations which in most cases lead to different locations and relate to multiple 
actors and incidents. Expertise in examining witnesses may also be required taking into 
account their protection and ensuring the rights of the accused.  
Moreover, the Draft Protocol states that the Appellate Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise 
the appealed decisions without restricting them to either „general‟, „human rights‟ or „criminal 
law‟ matters.483 The only court of appeal mentioned in the Draft Protocol is the „Appellate 
Chamber of the International Criminal Law Section‟, consequently creating the impression 
that the judges elected with expertise in criminal matters may also hear human rights 
matters.484  
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In the author‟s view, a criminal law judge may hear matters of human rights law if that judge 
also possesses expertise in the field of human rights law. The practice of judges hearing 
cases related to various areas of law will be problematic if judges are not expert in different 
legal fields, as they would not be as knowledgeable as they would have been if they had the 
necessary expertise. Consequently, the judges‟ lack of expertise may create bias towards 
the accused.    
Furthermore, the Draft Protocol states that the office of the prosecutor shall be “responsible 
for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes specified in this Statute” but, in contrast to 
the Rome Statute, it does not mention how the investigations are to be carried out.485   
The Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is not yet in force. As a result, 
the introduction of the Draft Protocol to extend criminal jurisdiction complicates matters and 
raises moot points.486 
In addition, the process followed to extend international criminal jurisdiction has  been 
criticised as lacking transparency due to limited consultation with legal experts and civil 
societies, for instance with regard to the definition of the crimes listed in the Protocol.487 The 
extension raises further legal implications due to its failure to address issues including: the 
relationship between African state parties to the Rome Statute; and the ICC and the existing 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, taking into account the principle of 
complementarity embraced by the ICC and that most African States488 are party to the Rome 
Statute.489  
There is further no mention in the Draft Protocol of the complementary relationship that 
would exist between the ICC and the new court.490 On closer reading of the two instruments, 
it would seem that both courts could prosecute the same case at the same time. A lack of 
clarity further exists with respect to the ICC and the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights regarding which court would have primacy; the possibility of an overlap of jurisdiction; 
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the prospect of conflicting legal obligations; and the possibility that some states may be 
required to contribute financially to both courts.491  
Examples of difficulties raised by the Draft Protocol with respect to the area of 
complementarity is in the relationship of domestic courts and the African court, taking into 
consideration those elements of crimes in the Draft protocol which may be different from the 
elements of crimes in domestic law. Submitting to the jurisdiction of the court may entail 
rewriting some domestic laws of African states.492 For example, crime of terrorism has a 
different definition in different states. Certain crimes listed in the Draft Protocol may not 
constitute crimes under domestic law, requiring an introduction of the crimes into domestic 
law for purpose of cooperation.493 However, there may be existing obligation cooperate with 
the ICC in the investigation of those crimes in domestic law.494  
The introduction of new laws or elements of law into domestic law may further depend on 
whether a state operates on a monist or dualist system. A state that uses a monist system 
does not need to translate international law into national law; once that state ratifies a 
particular international treaty, it automatically incorporates international law into national 
law.495 On the other hand, in a dualist state, international law is not directly applied 
domestically and translation of such international law into national legislation is required 
before its application. A national legislation has to be enacted adopting such international 
law.496  
In light of the above, temporal jurisdiction in the Draft Protocol states that the court has 
jurisdiction only to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Protocol and Statute.497 
The introduction of new laws or element of existing law may also prove to be difficult if the 
process is compared to the situation created by the Rome Statute. This is because 6 out of 
33 African states have adopted domestic legislation with respect to the Rome Statute.498 In 
the Draft Protocol, no mention is made of how the African countries already party to the ICC 
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would balance their legal obligations with respect to the extension of the criminal jurisdiction 
to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
In addition, the redistribution of resources to the proposed three sections may be 
problematic and lead to the neglecting of some sections.499 For example, more resources 
may be made available to the criminal section than the human rights section.500 Viljoen501 
suggests that a criminal court should exist independently, with its own distinct legal basis. 
The expansion of criminal jurisdiction to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
undermines the development of human rights systems.502 The merger between the African 
Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights and the African Court of Justice could already dilute 
the work of the former; and adding a third mandate to the African Court will further drain 
resources needed for the human rights mandate.503 It will take time for amendments 
expanding the African Court‟s jurisdiction to include criminal cases to take effect. On further 
consideration, there is also the ratification problem. It was a long process to get the Protocol 
on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights ratified and states would have to start the 
process all over again giving the states that had ratified the existing protocol the chance to 
invalidate their existing human rights commitments.504 Since 2008, only three states have 
joined the African Court merger Protocol.505 
Those that are not members of the ICC may use the prospect of future regional criminal 
jurisdiction to justify their non-membership of the ICC, but may also not give any guarantee 
that they will ever join the African Court‟s jurisdiction or cooperate with it.506Therefore, the 
expansion of the African Court‟s jurisdiction would sustain current gaps in accountability and 
undermine efforts to widen the reach of international justice.507 In the process, impunity and 
harm to the civilian population continues, and new internal armed conflicts continue to 
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emerge.508 In addition, issues of international justice are in most cases influenced by politics 
as the ICC has discovered. It is therefore difficult to prevent courts from becoming 
politicised.509 An example is the SADC Tribunal which was suspended in 2010 after 
complaints made by the state of Zimbabwe regarding a ruling that had gone against them.510 
During the SADC summit held in Mozambique, the members agreed to restrict the court‟s 
jurisdiction to only disputes between member states and excluded complaints from 
individuals.511 
In the above examples, there is a clear indication that politics can easily interfere with 
international justice as demonstrated in the SADC Tribunal by SADC members. The 
tribunal‟s protocol had to undergo a negotiation process to exclude such complaints.512 
Another example is the armed conflict in Mali which was referred to the ICC by its 
government. The referral was criticized for intending to weaken the government adversaries 
rather than end impunity.513 
 5 3 Conclusion 
In respect to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights having international criminal 
jurisdictions, authors who share the opinion of Viljoen maintain that a separate court should 
be established.514 In addition, further consultation and discussion should be entered into with 
the International Committee of Red Cross, relevant non-governmental organisations, officials 
of relevant institutions, civil society, and AU member countries, before the inclusion of 
international criminal jurisdiction into the existing court.515 Du Plessis516 further concludes 
that the Draft Protocol appears to have been rushed into existence and instead of the 
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instrument providing answers, it raises legal questions. He suggests that the AU set up a 
separate criminal court that compliments the work of the ICC, comprehensively funded, 
legally sound and free from political interference.517 On the other hand, Don Deya518 appears 
contend about the court and argues that considering the bitter divide between Africa and the 
ICC, there is no reason why the three sections cannot work harmoniously together. 
A recent development in Mali raised another issue with respect to the Draft Protocol. Mali 
recently referred their situation to the ICC519 despite AU‟s move to extend international 
criminal jurisdiction to African Court of Justice and Human Rights and to eliminate the 
involvement of the ICC in African affairs. The Mali government alleged that human rights and 
war crimes had been committed in the country during an attempted coup d’état by mutinying 
soldiers. The move by Mali which was supported by Western African countries could imply 
that the Draft Protocol is not necessarily supported by all African states. 
Africa has a history of adopting impressive legal texts, but failing to effectively implement the 
laws adopted.520 This demonstrates that, in practice, intention do not translate into success. 
It is argued that the creation of an African criminal court may be necessary, but questions 
were raised as to whether the AU possesses the resources to ensure the efficacy and 
legitimacy of the proposed criminal law regime and to ensure justice for Africa.521 
Critical analysis of the above Statutes, protocols, and international instruments with respect 
to provisions on jurisdiction should be considered before establishing an African criminal 
court. In referring to the Draft Protocol‟s effort to extend criminal jurisdiction for international 
crimes, it is clear that the drafting process was flawed as evidenced by the large number of 
legal implications arising from the document.  
Failure by the drafters of the Protocol to define the legal relationship that would exist 
between African countries party to the Rome Statute and the African court having such 
jurisdiction implies that intention were made to circumnavigate the ICC and reduce the 
court‟s involvement in the African region. If the establishment of the proposed African 
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criminal court is the result of an attempt to undermine the ICC, establishment of court may 
prove to be impossible as the majority of the African states are party to the Rome Statute. 
The expectation to ignore the complimentary relationship with the ICC may force states to 
remain party to the Rome Statute and refuse to recognise the proposed criminal court. The 
anti-ICC sentiment in Africa should be taken into account. Although an African criminal court 
may be necessary, provisions should be made to allow it to exist alongside the ICC. If this is 
not done, then the creation of such court is inadvisable due to the possible legal implications 
brought by such creation.  
The following chapter provides a conclusion of the issues discussed in the treatise and 
makes recommendations where necessary. The question to whether Africa needs a 
separate criminal court is further addressed in relation to the draft protocol and challenges 
faced by the ad-hoc tribunals and ICC.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Chapter Six 
6 1 Conclusion and Recommendations 
As proven, Africa has been subjected to various armed conflicts for decades. It is, thus, a 
sad reality that Africa is home to many international humanitarian law, criminal law, and 
human rights violations, even in peace time.522 The past and continuing cycles of inter-ethnic 
and civil wars on the continent have left millions of innocent civilians exposed to the most 
serious crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.523  Most severe 
armed conflicts have occurred in countries where states appear to be economically and 
politically weak.524 Demographical shifts in favour of the young, struggles over resources and 
welfare have displaced patriarchal systems in Africa and one of the consequences has been 
the enlistment of young children as combatants in armed conflicts for example in the 
Ugandan armed conflict.525 With respect to struggle for resources, the international 
community should develop a more effective way of dealing with goods that were obtained 
through violent means (for example blood diamonds in Sierra Leone) by for example placing 
an embargo on  goods of that kind which may automatically put pressure on the government 
to end an on-going conflict.   
In countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan for example, international 
criminal courts such as SCSL, ICTR, and the ICC have become regular and a fixture in the 
international legal scene in deterring future humanitarian atrocities.526 These courts 
excluding the ICC are ad hoc tribunals with limited jurisdiction, confined to atrocities arising 
out of a particular armed conflict with a mandate that will eventually expire. Ad hoc tribunals 
are therefore useful if established in a particular state and they are not beneficial to other 
victims of similar crimes in other countries. They are also costly especially in cases where 
the UN is forced to set up one every time an armed conflict takes place in a particular 
country. A regional criminal court addressing such international crimes may be best suited 
for this situation.    
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Once the tribunal‟s mandate has expired, victims of international crimes can only rely on 
national courts in their respective countries.527 The national legal systems, most importantly, 
the criminal systems of African states are not only always inherently weak but are also not 
sufficiently balanced and impartial to adjudicate international crimes, which are more often 
than not, committed by members of the armed conflict including senior government 
officials.528   
In addition, the African human rights systems for example in the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights and SADC tribunal, do not address the issue of impunity and individual 
criminal responsibility for international crimes. Weak legal systems in Africa have to be 
developed and strengthened in order to ensure proper accountability for example by 
educating the public on how legal systems work. An analysis of the existing law may be 
necessary in determining areas of law that are in adequate and in some states may be 
required to codify their laws. In several Africa countries, the legal systems are heavily 
influenced by the country‟s politics which may weaken their legal systems. The judicial 
systems of African states should attempt to be independent from any political interference. In 
strengthening their legal criminal systems, African states are encouraged to refer to regional 
instruments which may be of assistance, but because Africa does not have a regional 
criminal legislation, the establishment of an African criminal court may be necessary in 
developing this area of law. 
In relation to the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, apart from having limited jurisdiction, the 
statutes creating these courts face challenges in areas relating to individual criminal 
responsibility and areas involving amnesty and immunity. For purpose of this treatise, 
attention is paid to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes which are lengthily 
defined in the Statutes of the SCSL, ICTR, and the Rome Statutes of the ICC. Certain 
authors are of the view that the crimes stated in the Rome Statute are not properly defined 
which nullifies the validity the statute. Furthermore, the list relating to war crimes as stated in 
the Rome Statute has been criticised by ICC critics for failure to include all war crimes 
recognized in customary law; for example the prohibition on the use of chemical or biological 
weapons.529 In light of the above, after examining the three statutes in relation to the cited 
crimes, the Rome Statute provides a more detailed and broad definitions in comparison to 
the Statute of the ICTR and SCSL. 
                                                             
527
 Bangamwambo, F X “International Criminal Justice and the Protection of Human Rights in Africa” no date 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/5_Bangamwabo.pdf      
(accessed 2012-11-14) [105].  
528
Bangamwambo, F X “International Criminal Justice and the Protection of Human Rights in Africa” no date 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/5_Bangamwabo.pdf      
(accessed 2012-11-14) [105].  
529
Cryer et al  International to international criminal law and procedure  275.  
67 
 
The prohibition of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes forms part of 
customary international law. If a person commits such crimes, that person violates the 
prohibition stated under the Statute of ICTR, SCSL and Rome Statute if the courts have 
jurisdiction. The person may also be in breach of the Genocide Convention which prohibits 
genocide and requires punishment. If the state having the individual who has committed 
such crime is not party to the above statutes, the individual will still be liable under 
customary international law. War crimes require the existence of an armed conflict whether 
international or non-international in character. If the atrocities are committed post conflict, 
they are prosecuted as genocide or crimes against humanity and not war crimes.530 War 
crimes are also linked with IHL as they are regarded as grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.531 It is therefore necessary to refer to the principles of IHL when interpreting 
whether a war crime has taken place or not. 
Individual criminal responsibility is addressed by the Statutes of the ICTR, SCSL, Rome 
Statute and international law.  As already stated, Africa does not have a continental criminal 
court and national courts are neither well prepared nor willing to deal with individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes.532 In addition, the ICC is further available to address 
individual criminal responsibility, but recently the relationship between Africa and ICC has 
strained due to the court‟s involvement in the region and this led the AU to urge its members 
not to cooperate with the court. It is therefore, the author‟s view that an African criminal court 
of such nature should be considered as national courts are unwilling to prosecute and 
various states are refusing to cooperate with the ICC.   
In terms of rule 51 of customary international humanitarian law, individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes is regarded as a norm of customary international law applicable 
in international and non-international armed conflicts.533 Moreover, the study on customary 
international humanitarian law prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
concluded that individual criminal responsibility extends to commanders and other 
superiors.534 Therefore, a person holding a superior position can be held individually liable 
for crimes committed by subordinates if the superior was aware of the subordinates‟ actions 
and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent them. In this case, the subordinates are 
still held accountable for their individual conducts. A distinction between military and civilian 
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superior needs to be made in these statutes because questions are raised whether the level 
of accountability between the two is the same. In the author‟s view, a civilian superior should 
be less accountable in comparison to a military superior because of the position the superior 
holds, requires the superior to have known better. Looking at the provisions addressing 
individual criminal responsibility as stipulated in the Statute of SCSL and ICTR, they are not 
properly defined. For example the Statute of the SCSL includes “persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility” in its definition but fails to define who these persons are. 
Establishing individual criminal responsibility where a person did not participate in the actual 
commission of the crime cited is one of the biggest challenges faced by the ICTR and relates 
to for example, the investigation and prosecution of military and political leaders.535 This is 
may not only be a challenge for the ICTR but also for the ICC and SCSL. Political leaders 
hardly ever participate directly in armed conflicts and it is a challenge to hold them 
accountable. This is mostly common in the African regions for example the post-election 
violence in Kenya that took place in 2008.  
International Criminal liability should look beyond mere membership of an organisation, and 
suspects should not be punished simply for belonging to organisations with some members 
participating in criminal activities.536 This should be considered mostly in large-scale groups 
where an individual member may have little control over the actions and/or conduct of other 
members.537 The provisions under the Statute and Protocol of SADC Tribunal and Protocol 
on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights are, therefore, not appropriate 
for the proposed African criminal court because the nature of these courts are human rights 
based.  
With respect to joint criminal enterprise, the principle has not been developed properly yet. 
For example in the ICTR, the prosecutor has been failing to show how the accused 
contributed to joint criminal enterprise. This area requires attention if an African court is to be 
created. By looking at the three statutes, the ICC gives a broader and comprehensive 
framework of individual criminal responsibility in comparison to the other two. 
Apart from having limited jurisdiction, the SCSL, ICTR and ICC face other challenges in 
relation to the principle of jurisdiction reflected in the statutes of the above courts. The 
limitation is placed on time, territory and for ICTR and SCSL, limitation is placed on 
citizenship. Placing limitation on time with respect to jurisdiction can in certain cases be 
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problematic, for  example in the Statute of the SCSL, it gives the court jurisdiction for crimes 
committed from November 1996, where in actual fact, the armed conflict begun in 1991 
where the worst crimes were committed.538 Crimes committed before 1996 fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the court allowing the possibility of them not being prosecuted. On the other 
hand, by ignoring limitation on the time by drafters may contribute to a state‟s failure to be 
part of a treaty in attempt to avoid prosecution of its people. It is clear from the limitation 
placed on the territorial jurisdiction that the courts are not accessible to all victims of 
international crimes in the African continent. 
Various areas of the ICC need to be noted with respect to jurisdiction, firstly with article 17 of 
the Rome Statute.539 Article 17 declares judicial proceedings before the ICC permissible if 
and when state that would normally have jurisdiction is unwilling or genuinely unable to 
investigate or prosecute. The inability and unwillingness provided for by this article has been 
criticised for being ambiguous.540 Furthermore, the unwillingness relating to a state that 
openly refuses to conduct an investigation and/or prosecution of its own leaders, or conducts 
an ineffective investigation deliberately, or shows a trial with a predetermined outcome of 
innocence, the ICC can intervene and conduct a second trial of someone who has already 
been pronounced innocent by a domestic court.541 A number of critics of the ICC see this as 
a problem because the determination of effectiveness is made by the ICC itself; therefore, 
despite the principle of complementarity, the ICC is still empowered to act as a superior 
court.542  
Furthermore, article 124 provides that states parties have the right to reject the court‟s 
jurisdiction in respect to war crimes within seven years of submitting to it, while for non-state 
parties are not explicitly given the right to withdraw.543 Thus, the provisions of article 124 are 
deemed to be unfair to non-state parties, as it is unclear whether they enjoy the same 
protection as that given to a state party even though they have accepted jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the provision has been criticised and regarded as a „free pass‟ to commit war 
crimes by state parties to the statute which beats the whole purpose of what the court was 
formed for.544 In exercising jurisdiction, the ICC requires the cooperation of member states to 
enforce its mandate, demonstrating additional flaws related to the lack of enforcement 
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mechanisms regarding the court‟s decisions.545 Cooperation from member states is not 
always available as it was demonstrated by various AU members‟ refusal to cooperate with 
the ICC‟s indictment against president al-Bashir of Sudan accused of allegedly committing 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
With respect to the UN Security Council being empowered by the statute to refer a situation 
to the prosecutor, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it is unclear 
whether the crimes referred by this body must be within the four listed in article 5.546 In terms 
of article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the power to refer “any existence to 
threat of peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression”547 to the ICC. The author therefore 
submits that the UN Security Council may not refer any crime to the court, but the nature of 
the wording of the article raises questions and creates ambiguity, creating the impression 
that any crime that threatens the existence of peace may be referred to the court. In this 
instance, article 39 of the UN Charter should be read in conjunction with articles 5 and 13 of 
the Rome Statute, as the UN Security Council plays a role in the determination of the crime 
of aggression, which is not defined by the Statute but is also referred to under article 39 of 
the UN Charter. 
The discussions in Rome prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute were focused on creating 
a permanent international criminal court for crimes committed during armed conflicts and to 
do away with ad hoc tribunals. To date, a culture of impunity still exists despite the existence 
of a permanent international criminal court.  
Despite the attempt by the AU to extend the jurisdiction of African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights to criminal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
many others, the move by the AU raised many legal implications which might prove a 
challenge for the court to exercise the new jurisdiction. In addition, various authors suggest 
that further consultation and discussion should be entered into with the ICRC, relevant non-
governmental organisations, officials of relevant institutions, civil society, and AU member 
countries, before the inclusion of international criminal jurisdiction into the existing court.548 
Du Plessis further concludes that the Draft Protocol appears to have been rushed into 
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existence and instead of the instrument providing answers, it raises legal questions.549 He 
suggests that the AU set up a separate criminal court that compliments the work of the ICC, 
comprehensively funded, legally sound and free from political interference.550 
Failure by the drafters of the Protocol to define the legal relationship that would exist 
between African countries party to the Rome Statute and the African court having such 
jurisdiction implies that intention were made to circumnavigate the ICC and reduce the 
court‟s involvement in the African region. If the establishment of the proposed African 
criminal court is the result of an attempt to undermine the ICC, establishment of the court 
may prove to be impossible as the majority of the African states are party to the Rome 
Statute.  
The validity of amnesty and immunity for war crimes is questioned when a duty to prosecute 
exists. Duty to prosecute is derived from international conventions and international 
customary law.551 Duty to prosecute has however remained controversial as sources of such 
duty fail to expressly oblige states to prosecute.552 This implies that parties can still rely on 
immunity and amnesty as a defence. Furthermore, immunity and amnesty have lost their 
traditional recognition they previously had. Under contemporary international law, official 
persons may be prosecuted before an international court or tribunal despite the defence of 
immunity. Arguments have been raised that genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes are no longer permissible grounds for immunity.553  
With regard to the Statute of the ICTR, despite having provisions that may be linked to 
prohibition of immunity for state officials, there is no specific prohibition with regard to 
immunity. The Statute of SCSL does not explicitly provide provisions against immunity but 
case law shows that the court is against it. Despite the Rome Statute consisting of specific 
articles outlawing the defence of immunity from criminal proceedings, the provisions appear 
to be conflicting. In addition, there is no regional or universal international treaty regulating 
issues of immunity.554 
At present, there is no regional instrument outlawing the immunity of state officials in Africa. 
Consequently, it becomes problematic for the prosecutor to hold the perpetrator 
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accountable. The Constitutive Act of the African Union fails to expressly reject the use of 
immunity as a defence.555 Few African states have outlawed the immunity of state officials as 
a defence from prosecution.556 These countries include South Africa, Uganda, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Kenya, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Ethiopia.557 
Under international law, amnesty granted to any perpetrators liable for international crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes cannot be upheld and does not 
bind international or regional courts or tribunals.558 However, states can grant amnesty.559 
The Statute of SCSL is the only statute that specifically prohibits amnesty granted to any 
person and the Statute of the ICTR and Rome Statute does not specifically bar the use of 
amnesty defence. From the look of it, the Rome Statute appears to support the defence of 
amnesty. 
TRCs are important institution in the peacemaking processes, but where crimes not only 
offend national law but also international law, international community has an interest in the 
proceedings and favours prosecution as opposed to the establishment of TRC.560 Moreover, 
it is possible that a trial under the ICC may arise involving a former dictator granted amnesty 
and may require the prosecutor of the ICC to consider amnesty in the exercise of discretion, 
since amnesty is not specifically prohibited nor upheld in the Rome Statute.  
In the case of Uganda, the granting of amnesty became problematic once the ICC stepped 
in, as the court had to decide whether to consider amnesty granted to all parties that took 
part in the armed conflict for the sake of peace or to prosecute. This type of situation creates 
the dilemma of peace competing with justice, especially where society as a whole favours 
peace. This area needs to be developed especially where a court is faced with such 
dilemma. Arguments in favour of amnesty as opposed to prosecution include situations that 
involve child soldiers, and where granting of amnesty may contribute to peace and possible 
end to an armed conflict.  
Certain authors argue that prosecution has decreased after establishment of TRCs, even 
where the identity of the perpetrators are known.561 TRCs and prosecution appear to be 
competing mechanisms in practice when dealing with crimes. Various authors contend that 
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international critics, mostly strangers to repression, fail to understand societies‟ 
circumstances where amnesty is preferred over prosecution.562 Societies‟ circumstances 
such as the nature of the armed conflict should be taken into account when deciding whether 
to prosecute or to grant amnesty. This was the case in South Africa where the nature of the 
armed conflict and consequences that would have risen from the refusal to grant amnesty 
were regarded more harmful and would have affected the democracy that the people had 
fought for. Support for amnesty is also evident from the UN.563 
In determining whether to recognise amnesty, various international scholars contend that 
one must consider whether the amnesty strikes the appropriate balance between justice and 
peace.564 This means that the amnesty granted should end hostilities and avoid placing the 
cost of justice on the conflict-ridden state and on the other hand, it should hold criminals 
accountable for their actions by ensuring that they do not repeat the commission of similar 
crimes in future.565 In addition, there are also arguments in favour of prosecution as opposed 
to granting of amnesty. Prosecution may “deter violations of human rights, restore rule of 
law, and honour victim‟s rights to seek justice”.566 Although international scholars and 
various courts agree that domestic amnesties do not bar prosecution for international crimes, 
in reality, there have been few attempts to prosecute persons protected with such 
amnesties.567  Obtaining jurisdiction of such persons may prove difficult especially if that 
person holds a state office. These situations are very common in the African continent and 
the international community is not always willing to intervene whenever international crimes 
such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are committed as evident in 
DRC. It is therefore time to reconsider the importance of amnesties as they may be seen as 
the only mechanism of ending an armed conflict and saving lives of innocent civilians if 
drafted properly.  
In light of the above, the proposed African criminal court would have to consider the 
challenges faced by the above statutes and attempt to remedy them in order to avoid such 
problems recurring. In an attempt to establish an African criminal court with jurisdiction over 
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international crimes, the Draft Protocol568 provides a separate section that prohibits immunity 
from prosecution granted under international law, but fails to address the position of former 
state leaders who have been granted immunity from prosecution. In addition, it fails to 
address the issue of amnesty. The proposed African criminal court should provide provisions 
expressly addressing amnesty and immunity. 
6 2 Does Africa Need a Separate Criminal Court? 
When the AU decided to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the African court of justice and 
human rights, various legal implications were either, not foreseen or ignored. The challenges 
faced by the ICTR, SCSL and Rome Statute regarding the crimes in question, the principle 
of individual criminal responsibility, jurisdiction, immunity and amnesty should be taken into 
account when determining whether Africa can have a separate criminal court. The statute 
creating such a court should expressly address immunity, amnesty and provide guidelines 
as to when amnesty may be acceptable over prosecution. The principle of individual criminal 
responsibility needs to be re-visited because the nature of armed conflict is changing.   
The drafters of the African criminal court need to learn from the mistakes that were made 
under the Draft Protocol which purports to extend criminal jurisdiction to the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights. It is important to define the relationship between African states 
party to the Rome Statute and the African criminal court because a majority of the African 
states are also party to the Rome Statute. Furthermore, the relationship between the new 
court and the ICC needs to be addressed especially in the area relating to jurisdiction. If the 
establishment of the African criminal court is the result of an attempt to undermine the ICC, 
the establishment of the court may prove to be impossible considering the ICC membership 
of African states. Bearing in mind, the strained relationship between AU members and the 
ICC, an African criminal court maybe appropriate especially if majority of AU members 
remain hostile towards the court which depends on cooperation of state parties to enforce its 
decisions. Where there is no cooperation, the ICC‟s decisions become unenforceable thus 
making the court ineffective.  
The court should exist alongside the ICC and be free from political interference, although this 
may be difficult as demonstrated in the SADC Tribunal, and also because it is an additional 
challenge faced by the ICC. A sufficient consultation with for example the ICRC, relevant 
non-governmental organisations, and AU member states, official relevant institutions is also 
necessary.  If this is done, then an African criminal court may be something to consider in 
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the future but for now such a court is not necessary. Moreover, Africa is not in a position to 
administer its own criminal justice against war criminals.  
For a separate African criminal court to exist, African states need to strengthen their own 
national judicial systems. If the domestic systems are affective, the same mechanisms may 
be applied in the proposed African criminal court. This seems unlikely to happen as states 
do not have the capacity to enforce written laws due to lack of enforcement mechanisms, 
poor infrastructure (limited prisons), bureaucracy, lack of resources, and lack of civic 
education among the public. An example is on the already existing African Human Rights 
Courts where despite their existence, the African continent is still under attack from human 
rights abuses against civilians and overwhelmed with a culture of impunity.  
In addition, before the merger, the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights569 had not 
made any real impact. It was slow in passing judgements, many of the court‟s rulings were 
as a result of inconsequential issues usually dealt by a court registrar and other rulings had 
been against states that have not ratified the court‟s statute thus making them legally 
unenforceable.570 Moreover, in 2009, a proposal was made to extend the jurisdiction the 
African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights to genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.571 The proposal was rejected based on various reasons and one being inadequate 
resources available in the continent.572 The extension of criminal jurisdiction to have been 
effective, it required the cooperation of African states but evidence showed non-compliance 
with judgements of regional courts by African states thus indicating that cooperation would 
not be easily achieved.573 In addition, Africa has a history of adopting impressive legal texts, 
but failing to effectively implement the laws adopted. These are some of the reasons why the 
idea of a separate African court might be impossible at this stage. Until states develop 
effective measures to deal with these challenges, offer cooperation to regional instruments, 
a separate criminal court is currently not needed. 
The author further submits that support should be given to the ICC as it is the only existing 
permanent criminal court, with majority member states from Africa to ensure justice and 
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peace for the victims and civilians. The ICC should further consider the challenges faced by 
the ICTR, SCSL and its own challenges in order to be more affective and most importantly, 
amend its broken relationship with AU members for its proper function and enforcement of 
its decisions. The court should start by looking at situations in other regions apart from Africa 
and avoid operating with double standards.  
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